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Abstract 
What happened in the Middle East and North Africa after 2011? Did the millions of people in the MENA-region 
who demanded democracy experience democratic gains?  
Approaching seven years on, more than ten Arab countries have attempted at regime reform and to some degree, 
succeeded. By the blunt measures of overthrow versus not, only six countries succeeded to oust their leaders; in 
terms of democratization, only Tunisia is viewed as a success story. Although Tunisia witnesses a constitutional 
reform with a transition to a presidential-parliamentary state, there remain implications that the reformed state is 
making investments in institutions which may develop to democracy’s detriment. Yet, other countries have yet to 
experience any reforms in the least. Theories concerning why some Arab countries lack the requisites for a 
democratic transition have been manifold, and this masters-thesis will, together with quantifiable data on changes 
in the MENA-region, contribute to the existing literature on democratization in the MENA-region. In comparing 
quantifiable data from two different sources, this study concludes that, despite the inability to generalize the 
outcomes due to limited data, the democratic changes since the Arab Spring have only been sustainable in Tunisia.  
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1. Introduction 
Have the series of uprisings occurring in Arab majority countries between late 2010 and 2013 
– also referred to as the Arab Spring1 – led to democratic gains? 
The almost immediate upheavals in other Arab countries following the Tunisian “Jasmine 
Revolution” in late 2010 surprised scholars within the political field (Gause, 2011). There are 
scholars who assume that nothing changed in the Arab world as a collective (Sakbani, 2015), 
yet in some cases, there were significant reforms.  
Previous research on the Arab Spring’s implication on democracy has shown much interest 
for countries with overthrown presidents. The aftermaths of the Arab uprisings have hence 
been divided into a dichotomy between overthrow versus survival of executive leaders. This 
focus has been at the expense of other important developments on the ground, both during and 
after the Arab Spring.  
Take Morocco for example, where the parliament will now choose the Prime Minister, rather 
than him being appointed by the King (Hussain & Howard, 2013) or Algeria, where a 19-year 
state of emergency law was lifted in 2011 (Dessi, 2011). Civil societies and organizations 
have during this timeframe been able to negotiate with their rulers, even if they were not able 
or willing, to overthrow them (as in Kuwait, Algeria and Morocco).  
Scholars who argue against the dichotomous representation of overthrow versus persistence 
claim that the goal of protesters during the Arab Spring was not to overthrow their regimes 
(Lucas, 2014) – rather to negotiate for gradual political liberalization (Yom & Gause, 2012). 
Hence, this thesis will not emphasize overthrows when asking: Has the Arab Spring led 
toward democratic gains?  
This study will measure the existing level of democracy by comparing democratic 
components in 2006, to those in 2016. Five Arab countries are chosen for these comparisons – 
Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco in order to answer whether the Arab Spring has 
led to democratic gains. Changes may include steps towards democratization in some cases 
which are overlooked in previous research on this topic, but it may also include backsliding or 
further entrenchment into authoritarianism.  
                                                          
1 Also known as the Arab Awakening The term Arab Spring has been coined inspired by what was referred to as 
Prague Spring, a political liberalization of Czechoslovakia which occurred in 1968. 
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Using the fine-grained data sources of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, as well 
as survey results from the Arab Barometer (AB), this thesis employs a novel way to study the 
implications of the Arab Spring on democratization.  
This unique combination of data sources requires an additional focus point. This thesis 
evaluates these contemporary data sources’ significance in answering whether the Arab 
Spring led to democratic gains. AB and V-Dem are used for describing changes in democratic 
components from varying angles. By comparing expert-data with the domestic popular 
opinion from people in the affected countries, we gain a better understanding of different 
means of measuring democratic gains – or lack thereof. Referring to surveys will increase our 
ability to be critical of the existing literature on whether the Arab Spring has led toward 
democratic gains. 
This study will answer whether the events of the Arab Spring have led to any democratic 
gains, using the following order; section 2 will introduce previous research on why 
democracy in the Arab world deserves research, and how the uprisings of late 2010 may have 
impacted the notion of the Arab world’s insusceptibility to democratize. Section 3 will 
describe the theoretical framework which will guide this thesis in answering whether the Arab 
Spring has led toward democratic gains.  
Further on, an elaborate description of the data sources used in this thesis is included in 
section 4. The dependent variable of this study will be indicators of democratic gains,2 with 
the independent variable being the uprisings of the Arab Spring (2010-2013) – an impactful 
event which was expected to create serious change throughout the region. The 5th section will 
justify the selection of cases, while briefly introducing their political backgrounds. The 6th and 
final section will discuss the findings of this study to conclude whether the Arab Spring led 
toward democratic gains, and how data from surveys and country-experts may be useful when 
asking such a question. 
  
                                                          
2 Listed under 4.1.3 Statistical Description 
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2. Why study the Arab Spring – a Literature Review 
The uprisings among Arab countries between late 2010 and 2013 shared the goal of pushing 
regimes to implement democratic reforms. Accordingly, when asked what the main reasons 
behind the Arab Uprisings were, the most popular answers across the MENA-region were 
“Civil and political freedoms, and emancipation from oppression” (Arab Barometer, 2013), 
closely followed by “Betterment of the economic situation”.3 The series of upheavals in the 
MENA-region, triggered by these demands – and at times causes of civil wars – are referred 
to as the Arab Spring.4  
The region’s oil riches, military ties to political affairs, and religious, linguistic, and cultural 
similarities are known contributors to the Arab world’s evasion of democratic transitions 
during democracy’s second and third waves (Huntington 1991; Ross 2001; Lust 2004), which 
together formulate the concept of “Arab Exceptionalism”. These uprisings of Arab Spring, 
given the notion of Arab Exceptionalism, were unexpected for political scholars, and led to 
speculations around a fourth wave of democratization (Abushouk, 2016; Henry, Ji-Hyang, & 
Lee, 2012). 
Scholars have in the aftermath of the Arab Spring focused on; the stability of autocracies in 
the region until 2011 (Bellin 2012), its relation to oil resources and economic independence 
(Brownlee et al. 2015), and perhaps most complex of all: identifying the main reasons for the 
almost simultaneous uproars among Arab countries in 2011 (Anderson 2011). Scholars’ 
classical approaches, as well as contemporary adjustments made as a result of the Arab 
uprisings, are discussed below. 
2.1. “Arab Exceptionalism” 
“Arab Exceptionalism” is the more elaborated, theoretical explanation for the absence of 
democracy in the Arab world despite democratic waves elsewhere (Bellin, 2012; Huntington, 
1991; Ross, 2012). One classical approach to the Arab exceptionalism stems from Samuel P. 
Huntington’s article (1991), which discusses the similarities between the second and third 
democratic wave, and why these globally spread waves left the Middle East and Africa 
                                                          
3The consequences of neoliberal economic reforms (such as promoting privatizations) have exacerbated the 
already existing income-inequalities and corrupt activities, mainly in Egypt and Tunisia. Consequently, only 
connected and elite groups are affording to privatize public goods or own companies affiliated with international 
trade (Anderson, 2011).  
4 Referred to interchangeably as Arab Uprisings 
Nelika Karimi 9208192923 AG2340 Final Paper 
7 
 
unaffected (Huntington, 1991). He views culture as a factor separating the Middle East from 
North- and Latin America. The absence of support for democracy by Islamic leaders and the 
religious culture in the MENA-region is, according to Huntington, counterintuitive to 
democratic progress (Huntington, 1991:28) – an argument from the school of modernization. 
Aside from the cultural/religious similarities, the countries’ oil-resources are viewed as 
exceptional to the region, as explained through the Rentier-State Theory. International oil-
rents, or financial aid of kinds, tend to reduce citizens’ incentive to challenge the autocracy 
(Ross, 2009), while financially keeping the government empowered and expanding. 
Authoritarian, or personalist states, also rely on military loyalty which is yet another variable 
which makes the Arab world “exceptional” in its insusceptibility of democracy. Oil-rents 
facilitate employment of public officials and the military force. Yet, such behaviors are not 
exclusive to oil-rich countries. The sections below will elaborate on the above-mentioned 
variables of Arab Exceptionalism. 
Modernization Theory  
One major challenge in reaching democratic transitions is known as the imposed social and 
religious constraints within the MENA-region (Ross, 2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; 
Huntington, 1991; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). The dynamics between such constraints and 
lack of democratic transitions in the MENA-region can be explained through the 
“modernization theory”. 
While the school of modernization theory provides different mechanisms for political 
development, the foundation of the theory focuses on a country’s ability to industrialize 
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Classical approaches claim that economic development resulting 
from industrialization will most likely lead to political and democratic progress (Przeworski 
& Limongi, 1997). The lack of industrialization, due to oil-rents and financial aids in the 
MENA-region, makes this theory relevant in predicting their possibility of democratization.  
Cultural and religious influences on the political status-quo in the MENA-region are argued to 
result in the lack of industrialization and thus lack of democratic gains (Huntington, 1991; 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000). While Huntington argues for secularism as the prerequisite for 
democratic development, Inglehart and Baker who are of a more contemporary standpoint 
believe that maintaining traditional values and achieving democratic gains are not mutually 
exclusive (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Inglehart and Baker add, that while secularity may 
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contribute to economic gains, its impact on democratic gains is too path-dependent and fluid 
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000:49). Both schools do however refer to Islamic countries to support 
their arguments. 
While the political emphases on traditional and religious values are not exclusive to the 
MENA-region by any means, it is one of the more frequently discussed attributes when 
studying Arab-majority countries. A controversial argument which amplifies the classical 
notion of the modernization theory, is that Islamic countries which base their constitution on 
Sharia laws5 alone are governed in a way which counteracts a democratic transition (United 
States Institute of Peace, 2002; Brownlee et al., 2015).  
However, contemporary literature on the significance of Islam on democratization, which 
consists primarily of qualitative research, claims the prevalence of Islam is of no significance 
to the survival of democracy. A concrete argument in favor of this claim is made by Linz and 
Stepan;  
“It should be better known than it is—particularly in most Arab countries—that close to 300 million 
Muslims have been living under democracy for each of the past ten years in the Muslim-majority 
countries of Albania, Indonesia, Senegal, and Turkey. If one adds the roughly 178 million Muslims who 
are natives of Hindu-majority India, the total number of Muslims living in democracies outside the West 
begins to approach half a billion.” (Linz & Stepan, 2013:17). 
Challenges of a Rentier-state: Oil’s impact on democratization 
In previous literature, the unique ability of Arab authoritarians to remain in power is largely 
explained by their oil-riches, and international foreign aid granting leaders economic 
independence from their citizens (Bellin, 2012). These factors together make up what is 
known as the Rentier State Theory (RST) (Mahdavy, 1970). 
Oil-exporting countries, such as a majority of Middle Eastern states, have the ability to be 
economically self-sufficient due to oil-rents paid by importing countries. This economic self-
sufficiency stretches to the extent where leaders may choose to collect low/no taxes from their 
citizens (such as those in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya), yet continue to fund the central 
government due to a large portion of their national wealth containing oil-rents (Ross, 2009).  
                                                          
5 Traditional Islamic laws  
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As a result, public goods and welfare services are easily provided in exchange with people’s 
satisfaction with their status quo, and thus helps maintain existing inequalities or lack of 
democracy (Herb, 2005). Consequently, subordination by the public in exchange for access to 
oil-rents occurs, in other words, clientelism and corruption increases (Bellin, 2012). 
It is important to note that oil-poor countries, referred to as “pseudo-rentier” states, also 
benefit from such aid (Kienle, 2012). Such states benefit from foreign financial- or military 
support due to their strategic geographic locations or appeal as political alliances (Yom & 
Gause, 2012). Oil-poor countries such as Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt can be considered within 
this category of pseudo-rentier [see Table 1.]. These countries derive a lot of government 
financing from foreign sources, such as Western democracy promotion or security efforts, as 
well as Gulf-backed aid packages to strengthen their government.  
The temporary thrills of such expenditures are known as one of the largest instigators of the 
uprisings of 2011 in pseudo-rentier states (Gause, 2011). 
Table 1. Oil-Rent per Capita of Arab States 
Rentier-
States 
Oil-
rent/Capita 
Population 
(million) 
Pseudo-
Rentier-States 
Oil-
rent/Capita 
Population 
(million) 
Qatar $ 67,741 2.5 Tunisia $ 4,145 11 
Kuwait $ 34,358 4 Jordan $ 3,400 8 
Bahrain $ 22,481 1.4 Morocco $ 3,136 35 
Saudi Arabia $ 21,265 32 Egypt $ 2,594 90 
Oman $ 16,357 4.2 Yemen $ 1,093 26 
Libya $ 5,489 6    
Algeria $ 4,761 40    
This table is inspired by Michael Ross’ measure of oil-rents with respect to population size. Comparing oil-
income to population size is more informative than referring to its portion of a country’s total GDP since the 
outcome will be based on a percentage of GDP and is therefore often misleading (Ross, 2009:4). The numbers 
are from 2015 and derived from The World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS).  
 
Importing countries have responded through military or political interventions when their 
trade-partners have experienced domestic unrest (Brownlee et al. 2015; Geddes et al. 2014; 
Hinnebusch, 2015). Libya and Iraq are two famous examples of the aftermaths of foreign 
interventions. In referring to these two cases, research claims that intervening in rentier-states 
often result in the exacerbation of ongoing, domestic conflicts. The relationships with the 
United States mainly, in addition to France and Britain, have been analyzed repeatedly in 
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order to decipher whether international interventions, resulting from oil-wealth, can lead to 
democratic progress (Hinnebusch 2015; Yom & Gause 2012).  
Military loyalty  
Military loyalty arguably determines the lifespan of authoritarians (Geddes et al. 2014). The 
events of Arab Spring have put this notion to the test in combination with the effects of oil-
riches (Brownlee et al. 2015; Linz & Stepan 2013). When allowed more political influence, 
the military often operates to the detriment of democratic transitions, particularly if the 
institution is ethnically linked to the country’s leader, as the case of Libya (Geddes et al. 
2014). With such linkage, also known as a personalist regime, the military gains confidence in 
surviving anti-regime uprisings. Responding to uprisings with violence are thus more likely to 
occur, which is mainly why military loyalty is viewed as challenging for democratization 
(Bellin, 2012; Geddes et al. 2014). 
Eva Bellin is one author who studies the mechanisms between a personalist state and 
democratization in the MENA-region (Bellin, 2012). Regarding the Middle East, Bellin 
explains this relationship in the following way;  
“Extraordinary access to rent and international support, combined with the less extraordinary 
proliferation of patrimonially organized security forces and low levels of social mobilization, together 
gave rise […] to coercive apparatuses6 that were endowed with extraordinary capacity and will to 
repress. This capacity and will to repress accounted for the region's exceptional resistance to getting 
swept up in the third wave of democratization”. (Bellin, 2012:129) 
Oil-rents and foreign aid act as safety-nets for the military. A personalist state, which receives 
high oil-revenues, is less likely to punish its military for abuse of power, as seen in Libya and 
Bahrain since 2011 (Brownlee et al. 2015).  
However, when the military operates independent of the head-of-state, they may oppose the 
establishment entirely. This occurred in Egypt and Tunisia and gained much attention and 
praise for the military’s reluctance to use violence as means of silencing the protesters, but 
rather supported them in their quest for a new leadership. Egypt and Tunisia are both oil-poor 
countries.  
                                                          
6 Bellin’s definition of the coercive apparatus is the military and head of state who are interlinked and reluctant 
to divide their political power with outsiders. 
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There is evidently a contrast in military operations between oil-rich and oil-poor countries, 
which supports Bellin in that “extraordinary access to rents and international support” 
(2012:129) plays a pivotal role in authoritarian persistence and that the military apparatus is 
one channel through which democratization is affected. 
Arab exceptionalism is multifaceted. Some of the more discussed factors behind the region’s 
exceptionalism are discussed in this section to introduce the reasons behind the lack of 
democracy in the MENA-region. This thesis will complement the mentioned theories with 
empirical data derived from surveys and expert-datasets, concerning five countries which 
experienced mass-protests between late 2010 and 2013. More on the background of the 
protests and the current challenges of the MENA-region will be explained in the next section.  
2.2. What is the Arab Spring?  
When the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated in Tunisia due to poor living 
standards in December 2010, it was not assumed that multiple revolutions in the neighboring 
countries would follow (Kienle, 2012). Scholars within the political field describe the almost 
immediate upheavals following the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” as unforeseeable (Gause, 
2011).7  
While definitions of what the Arab Spring entails may vary, most scholars believe it 
comprises the protests and regime changes which have taken place among the Arab countries8 
caused by demands for political reforms, between December 2010 and late 2013 (Brownlee et 
al. 2015). 
Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco9 are the five countries which experienced large 
protests10 against their heads of state between late 2010 and 2013. The next section will 
elaborate on what the main causes of the upheavals were, before discussing what literature 
believes has been the aftermath of the Arab Spring.  
                                                          
7 M. Kamrava was not as surprised by the wave of uprisings in the Arab world. He argues that these uprisings 
had already happened – however on a smaller scale, in 2005 (Kamrava, 2014). 
8 This thesis refers to the Arab world as the group of countries inhabited by an Arab-majority population where 
the national language is Arabic. 
9 Iraq, Yemen and Syria have been excluded from this list because the civil wars and foreign interventions in the 
countries during the Arab Spring make it difficult to examine the impact of the Arab Spring alone. 
10 Choosing McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s (2001) definition of an uprising as events where a country faces 1) 
peaceful mass-protest10 lasting multiple days, 2) occupation of popular sites and cities and 3) spread of protest 
across cities (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001).  
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2.2.1. Motivations for Protest  
People’s expectations when organizing demonstrations during the Arab Spring have been to 
establish democratic components, such as competitive elections and freedom of expression 
(Gause, 2011). Demand for democratic progress is argued to be the largest driving force of the 
Arab uprisings. The aim of this thesis is therefore to as much as possible, answer whether the 
protests of Arab Spring have led toward democratic gains.  
The protests, mostly driven by disenfranchised youths, upper middle class and grass-root 
organizations in the Arab world gained worldwide attention. Civil societies grew in countries 
which allowed for institutionalization to take place (Egypt and Tunisia in particular), and the 
support for a Western variety of democracy gained a pivotal platform which came to lead the 
upheavals (Lynch, 2016). 
Almost all countries which have experienced the Arab Uprisings have a young population – 
almost 50% of the population in Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, and Bahrain are under the 
age of 25.  
DataBank – World Development Indicators (modeled ILO estimate) 
Total unemployment rate (% of 
total labor force) (2009) 
Unemployment, youth total (%of 
total labor force ages 15-24) (2009) 
Algeria  10.2 Algeria  21.5 
Egypt 9.4 Egypt 27.3 
Tunisia  13.3 Tunisia  30.4 
Jordan  12.9 Jordan  28.6 
Morocco 9.1 Morocco 18.1 
The left-side table shows the total unemployment rates in the five case-countries. The table to the right lists the 
proportion of the total unemployed population between the ages 15-24. Data is calculated according to measures 
from International Labor Organization (ILO). Data is derived from WorldBank. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS&country=DZA,YEM,EGY,TUN,JOR,MAR  
Tunisians, Egyptians, and Jordanians have experienced a minimum of 25% unemployment 
rate among their youth (Arab Barometer, 2016a). Judging from their slogans, lack of jobs has 
been a major driving force for the upheavals (Lynch, 2016; Worth, 2014).  
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Demands for political reform were prioritized differently across borders. According to 
Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2015) “Morocco, Algeria and nearly all Gulf monarchies 
protests […] did not concentrate political disaffection on incumbent rulers—as occurred in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain.” (Brownlee et al. 2015:18). Such 
countries’ concerns mainly revolved around the existing economic and social inequalities 
experienced by minorities – as seen in Kuwait, Algeria, and Morocco. 
Presidencies in large experienced the most powerful uprisings, which is argued to be caused 
by lack of a fixed successor (Bellin, 2012). The three first countries experiencing the Arab 
Spring (Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt) exemplify such attitude – all three countries overthrew 
their presidents. 
Existing research on the impact of Arab Spring on democratization is for most part 
qualitatively conducted, with reference to Arab Exceptionalism as predetermining the 
likelihood of democratization in the MENA-region. This study will contribute to the existing 
knowledge of the aftermath of Arab Spring, by relating details of democracy with empirical 
evidence from surveys and expert data. The relevant definition of democratic gains is 
elaborated in section 4.1 before this thesis refers to empirical data in order to answer whether 
the Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains.  
2.3. The aftermath of the Arab Spring 
Despite the variables which have contributed to the aftermaths of the Arab uprisings, 
scholarly work has yet to clarify why some Arab countries have achieved democratic gains, 
while others have experienced an even more authoritarian regime than before the Arab 
Spring. 
This section will reiterate rentierism and international influence on the MENA-region to 
understand their impacts on the uprisings of Arab Spring.  
2.3.1. Rentierism 
The Western countries’ decision to intervene in the Arab Spring countries’ domestic conflicts 
has affected the probabilities of democratic transitions in the region (Hinnebusch, 2015). An 
extensive sum of scholarly research on the implications of foreign interventions in the 
MENA-region has focused on the role of United States in particular.  
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For instance, economic interests are deemed to have enforced the U.S-led military 
intervention in Libya. This intervention exacerbated an already divided country and arguably 
led to their ongoing civil war. U.S. interventions in oil-poor Syria have led to a similar 
aftermath (Önis, 2012).  
American support of the Egyptian army helped determine the fast pace with which the 
country managed to oust its president (Kienle, 2012). On the other hand, a moderate amount 
of international interventions in Tunisia has played a pivotal role in their successful 
democratic progress (Hinnebusch, 2015). 
Pseudo-rentier Egypt and Jordan have likewise received much of the United States’ support in 
forms of development aid. In addition to economic gains, geographic and politically strategic 
components of some Arab countries have determined much of foreign countries’ roles in the 
outcomes of the Arab Spring. 
Oil-rents have enabled monarchies such as Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to increase 
subsidies and wages after the uprisings of 2011 in order to distract people from demanding 
reform – a successful tactic in preventing people from taking to the streets (Lucas, 2014). 
Even pseudo-rentier monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan have spent their foreign aid on 
generous subsidies and wages to gain control over the demonstrations of 2011 (Yom & 
Gause, 2012).  
*** 
To conclude the chapter on existing literature, it is helpful to summarize the many countries’ 
characteristics in accordance with the notion of Arab exceptionalism. Many scholars have 
viewed successful replacement of presidents as an omen for democratic progress. In 
examining five countries with different outcomes for their executive leaders, this thesis also 
offers an insight into whether replacing incumbents is in fact a good sign for democratic 
progress.  
The table below lists the various characteristics of eleven Arab countries which had over 
10 000 protesters, and the most turbulent year for each country. The aim of this table is to, in 
a systematic fashion, describe the differences among Arab states in terms of electoral systems 
and oil-reserves. 
Table 2. List of countries involved in the Arab Spring and their characteristics 
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Country Population  Extent of protests Oil Regime type Civil war Overthrow* 
Algeria 40 million +10 000 (2011) Yes Presidency No No 
Bahrain** 1,4 million +100 000 (2011) Yes Monarchy No Yes 
Egypt 90 million +10 million (2013) No Presidency No Yes 
Jordan 8 million +10 000 (2012) No Monarchy No Yes 
Kuwait** 4 million +10 000 (2011) Yes Monarchy No No 
Libya** 6 million +10 000 (2011) Yes Presidency Yes Yes 
Morocco 35 million +10 000 (2012) No Monarchy No No 
Saudi 
Arabia** 
32 million +50 000 (2012) Yes Monarchy No No 
Syria** 16 million +100 000 (2011) Yes Presidency Yes No 
Tunisia 11 million +100 000 (2010) No Presidency No Yes 
Yemen** 27 million +1 million (2013) No Presidency Yes Yes 
*Overthrow in monarchies refers to the replacement of Prime Ministers – not Kings.  
**Syria, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bahrain are not included among the case-countries due to 
lack of data resulting from their current volatile state, international interventions and states’ censorship effort.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
Democratic gains can be conceptualized in numerous ways depending on what type of 
democracy we are interested in. This section will refer to two theories on democracy – the 
“Polyarchal regime” and “participatory democracy”. A polyarchal regime requires high levels 
of transparency from state-institutions to ensure the equal treatment of all members of society. 
The aim of a participatory democracy is to provide all members of society with the equal 
opportunity to participate in political and social spheres. Both are important for understanding 
the requirements in a democratic state.  
These theories will together justify the choice of datasets used in this thesis. Using databases 
such as Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) and Arab Barometer (AB) will concretize whether 
the Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains. 
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3.1. What are Democratic Gains? 
There is an extensive amount of literature on what democratic transition entails. 
Contemporary political science concern emancipative values and gender equality for already 
established democracies (Welzel, 2014), whereas classical approaches focus on transparency 
of the leadership and higher public participation (Dahl, 1971), the state’s ability to secure rule 
of law (Olson, 1993) its relation to the economy (Miltzer & Richard, 1981), and the 
importance of social engagements on democratic performance (Putnam, 1993).  
This section highlights Robert Dahl’s “Polyarchal regime” while incorporating Robert 
Putnam’s “participatory-democracy” in order to conceptualize democracy. These theories 
include fundamental requirements of a democratic system and are therefore topical when 
speaking about new democracies, such as those which may flourish in the MENA-region as a 
result of the Arab Spring. 
3.1.1. Robert Dahl’s Polyarchal Regime 
While a selected few govern an oligarchy, and one powerful actor governs a monarchy, Dahl's 
polyarchal regime is governed by the masses - for the masses (Dahl, 1984).  
Following this definition, a polyarchal regime is responsible for guaranteeing and protecting 
the masses’ ability to elect the rightful leader – free from outside influences such as bribery or 
coercion (Dahl, 2006). According to Dahl, a polyarchal regime needs to include institutions 
which provide and protect the following components; 
 “universal suffrage  
 suffrage coextensive with the right to run for public office 
 fairly conducted elections accompanied by negligible or no coercion 
 extensive protection of free expression, including criticism of the government, the 
regime, society, the dominant ideology, and so on. 
 the existence of alternative and often competing sources of information and persuasion 
not under the control of the government 
 a high degree of freedom to form relatively autonomous organizations of great variety, 
including, most crucially, opposition political parties 
 relatively high responsiveness of the government to voters and election outcomes.” 
(Dahl, 1984:228-229) 
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In other words, the institutions required for a polyarchal regime must protect the citizen’s 
right to elect the candidate whose agenda favors their everyday life. Voters should be 
encouraged, without coercion, to cast their votes in an election.  
The possibility to run for office despite one’s religion, ethnic background, or gender must also 
be secured in order to ensure a fair representation of the country’s aggregate population. In 
the case of unforeseen outcomes from elections, institutions involved in conducting elections 
shall be transparent in their work and provide evidence to confirm the results of the election.  
Furthermore, people must be confident in expressing their disagreements with their regime, 
without risking their safety or freedom. State-institutions should hence refrain from censoring 
alternative sources of information, which may argue against the current regime, and/or be in 
favor of another ideology.  
Establishing these institutions is a prerequisite for any existing polyarchal democracy. What 
makes such a democracy important is its governance by the masses – for the masses. Enabling 
the equal political participation of all members of a country, as well as their ability to monitor 
and, if necessary, punish the behaviors of their incumbents, are the characteristics which 
separate such a democracy from an authoritarian state. The section below will further explain 
how the existence or absence of these institutions can be measured.  
3.1.2. How is the Polyarchy Index measured? 
Inspired by Robert A. Dahl (1971), Coppedge and Reinicke designed a Polyarchy-Scale in 
1986, which has abbreviated the seven conditions in Dahl’s Polyarchal state into four broader 
categories. Each category includes components which contribute to their level of polyarchy, 
and the performance of each component is scaled between 0-4 or 0-3. “0” indicates a non-
democratic performance of the component, while the highest score is given to the components 
which are best aligned with the Polyarchy framework. 
The four categories are; Free and fair elections, freedom to organize, freedom of expression, 
and a measure of availability of alternative sources (Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990:51). The 
expert-database called Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) provides this thesis with the 
measurements and helps graph the development of indicators relevant to democratic gains. 
Before introducing the data, an additional theory on democratization is included. The 
following theory concerns participatory-democracy, and albeit more abstract than the 
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Polyarchy Index, it is applicable to the way we interpret the impact of the Arab Spring on 
social freedoms. 
3.1.3. Participation as prerequisite for democratization 
Robert D. Putnam (1993) looks at already-existing democracies and analyzes their causal 
mechanism. One of his remarkable works, “What Makes Democracy Work”, is a comparative 
case-study between northern and southern Italy, where correlations between hierarchal state-
structures and democratic performance are investigated.  
In this body of work, Putnam found that regions with close ties between their incumbents and 
civilians had more economic and political development, whereas the areas without 
cooperation between civilians and public officials faced corrupt activities and lack of growth 
in democracy (Putnam, 1993). 
He concludes that, for democracy to work, a state must promote:  
 civic engagement (through civil society organizations (CSO’s)) 
 solidarity and trust 
 political equality 
 and creation of associations (Putnam, 1993) 
According to Putnam (1993), in order to achieve these components, “social capital” is 
required. This type of capital builds upon networking and civic engagement concerning 
different social matters. Investing in social capital contributes to solidarity, through improving 
people’s perception and treatment of others as their equals. Networking platforms and 
association-groups which advocate equal treatment strenghten a bond among its members, as 
they contribute to more trust and a culture of reciprocity of favors (“norm of reciprocity” 
(Putnam, 1993:101)).  
In conclusion, the level of democracy increases when people feel supported by their fellow 
citizens. Putnam’s social capital aims to create such an environment where people can work 
together, alongside their public officials and political leaders, to impact their country for the 
better. For this, the state is required to invest in institutions which promote civic engagement.  
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3.1.4. Hypothesis 
Two data-sources are chosen for answering whether the Arab Spring led toward democratic 
gains. One data-source provides domestic popular opinion on the levels of democracy in each 
country (Arab Barometer). Another data-source refers to empirical data accumulated by 
country-experts (V-Dem), who scale the levels of democracy in each country. By comparing 
the findings of these two sources, this thesis assesses whether democratic gains took place in 
the MENA-region as a result of the Arab Spring – using fine-grained data for a more nuanced 
perspective.  
Since the two data-sources look at the same five countries, the first hypothesis claims that 
their findings will mirror one another:  
H1: Five Arab majority-countries have experienced democratic gains as a result 
from the uprisings of the Arab Spring (2010-2013). Expert-data from V-Dem 
and domestic public opinion from Arab Barometer surveys will show 
democratic progress for the five Arab after 2013 than before/during the Arab 
Spring. 
V-Dem and Arab Barometer offer different perspectives on what democratic gains mean. One 
perspective is derived from country-experts’ and scholars’ understanding, and the other is 
based on the perception of people experiencing democracy. This may result in different 
outcomes in the data, which leads to a second hypothesis. If this hypothesis is accurate, the 
outcome of this thesis would reject the null hypothesis: 
H2: The empirical findings from Arab Barometer do match those from V-Dem. 
It is safe to claim that democratic gains have occurred in the MENA-region. 
Having two hypotheses in this study will both claim whether the Arab Spring has led to 
democratic gains (H1), while also shining light on the significance of using two different data-
sources to answer such a research question (H2).  
Nelika Karimi 9208192923 AG2340 Final Paper 
20 
 
4. Methodology & Research Design 
The majority of research on democracy after the Arab Spring use qualitative methods. This 
thesis will focus on quantitative data to answer whether the Arab Spring has led toward 
democratic gains. 
This study looks at five case-countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco). 
Survey-data conducted during 200611 and 2016, together with expert-data will describe 
democratic changes in the MENA-region. A brief analysis of the findings will follow, with 
reference to Arab Exceptionalism and the mentioned theoretical frameworks, to answer 
whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains. 
4.1. Research Design 
Survey-data (Arab Barometer) is compared to expert-data (V-Dem) to assess whether the 
Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains. Both datasets include the five case-countries 
(Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco). 
AB and V-Dem both measure their findings on Likert-type scales. This thesis will illustrate 
their findings using different methods. This is because V-Dem data is more visually 
comprehensive, while the survey data (AB) needs more processing to determine whether 
change in people’s perception of democratic gains are significant.  
Hence, V-Dem data is pictured using graphs, and statistical analyses are carried out on AB 
surveys. The outcome of graphs and statistical analyses, must both show an increase in 
polyarchy-scores, after the Arab Spring (2010-2013), in order for democratic gains to be 
assumed. 
4.1.1. Independent variable: The Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring (2010-2013) – a period of massive protests throughout the MENA-region – 
was a critical juncture for democracy in the Arab world. Countries which carried out mass-
protests were experiencing larger income-gaps and poorer living standard (Anderson, 2011). 
The high unemployment-rate among the higher-educated youth aggravated the people, who 
                                                          
11 Data from 2007 may be included for Arab Barometer. 
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did not receive support from their political leaders. Hence, the uprisings in Arab countries in 
the beginning of the 2010’s were expressions of their dissatisfaction with their status-quo.  
Many scholars claim that it was the persistence of authoritarian rule which led people to 
protest (Kienle, 2012; Kamrava, 2014; Bellin, 2012). The republican countries involved were 
ruled by the same presidents for more than twenty years (Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, and 
Libya). The monarchies were governed for longer by the same families (Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait).  
What made the protests of Arab Spring impactful was their simultaneous formation across the 
MENA-region. Considering their socio-political uniqueness (Arab Exceptionalism), scholars 
claim that these protests could lead to a democratic transition in the MENA-region. This study 
assesses whether the protests of Arab Spring did realize this claim. 
4.1.2. Dependent variable: Democratic gains 
The dependent variable, democratic gains – will be measured using two different sources of 
data.  
The five countries which will be examined are Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco 
due to the sufficient data available on both Arab Barometer (surveys) and V-Dem (expert-
data).  
The surveys used to in this thesis are provided by the Arab Barometer.12 This database offers 
fixed editions, also referred to as waves. Wave I (2006-7) represents people’s perception of 
the level of democracy prior to the Arab Spring. Wave IV (2016) describes people’s 
perception of democratic components after the Arab Spring. WII (2011) will be included for 
Tunisia and Egypt, due to their absence from WI.  
Expert-data on the other hand, is derived from Varieties of Democracy.13 Each case-country’s 
democratic progress between 2006 and 201614 is scaled on a Polyarchy Scale, and the results 
are compared between years. The Polyarchy Scale [see section 3.1.2.] is interpreted through 
                                                          
12 http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/online-data-analysis 
13 The Institute for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) combines different external indices for a better overview of 
different countries during different time-periods (Coppedge et al. 2016). 
14 Years may vary based on available data 
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the Electoral Democracy Index, which encompasses all four categories mentioned by 
Coppedge and Reinicke (1990).  
Variables in the following list are measured by country-experts on a Likert-type 4 point scale, 
where “4” indicates a positive outcome toward democratizing, and “0” equal non-democratic 
characteristics (Varieties of Democracy, 2017b). A Multiplicative Polyarchy Index (MPI) has 
been applied to each sub-index as a lens through which the weakest components (those which 
score the lowest) affect the outcome.  
This method of aggregation is preferred because it does not present the average of each 
component alone, but illustrates the consequences brought by declining democratic 
components (Varieties of Democracy, 2017a:48). The aim of the MPI is therefore to prevent 
the illusion of democratic gains, while other important democratic components decline 
(Varieties of Democracy, 2017a).  
Below is the list over the selected democratic components, inspired by Dahl’s Polyarchal 
regime; 
The Polyarchy Index 
Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) 
a. Clean Elections Index 
i. Election Management Body (EMB) autonomy 
ii. EMB capacity 
iii. Election free and fair 
iv. Election government intimidation 
v. Election other electoral violence 
vi. Election other voting irregularities 
vii. Election vote buying 
viii. Election voter registry 
b. Expanded Freedom of Expression Index 
i. Freedom of academic and cultural expression 
ii. Freedom of discussion 
1. Freedom of discussion for men 
2. Freedom of discussion for women 
iii. Government censorship effort – Internet  
iv. Government censorship effort – Media 
v. Harassment of journalists 
vi. Media bias 
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vii. Media self-censorship 
viii. Print/broadcast media critical/perspectives 
c. Freedom of association index 
i. Barriers to parties  
ii. CSO (Civil Society Org.) entry and exit 
iii. CSO repression 
iv. Elections multiparty 
v. Opposition parties autonomy 
vi. Party Ban 
I have removed two sub-indices from the Electoral Democracy Index, due to their lack of 
relevance to the research question. Although vital components of Robert Dahl’s Polyarchal 
Regime, these two sub-indices are more related to formal institutional policies and were not 
the highlighted challenges in the MENA-region during the Arab Spring. Therefore, studying 
the two in addition to the more relevant components such as civil liberties and quality of 
election would be too ambitious for the scope of this thesis. The excluded sub-indices are 
each explained below. 
“Elected officials index” – This index concerns the structure and authority of parliament, 
by asking questions regarding head-of-state’s ability to appoint ministers, how party 
members of various chambers are elected etc. Including these components would distract 
from the research question. Neither do they concern monarchies, which result in unequal 
information.  
“Share of population with suffrage” – This index shows the share of the population with 
suffrage. Because the population with suffrage remained the same after the Arab Spring, I 
view this index as not relevant to the aim of this thesis. 
The three sub-indices in this study will summarize the essential components of a polyarchal 
regime as defined by Coppedge and Reinicke’s Polyarchy-Scale (1990). These sub-indices are 
translated into graphs for a visual mapping of democratic changes. 
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The Arab Barometer  
The Arab Barometer (AB) conducts its surveys in Arab countries exclusively. Wave I (2006-
2007) will be compared to its Wave IV (2016).15 Wave I does not include Egypt and Tunisia 
which is when Wave II (2011) will be included instead.  
Wave I (or II) helps describe the probable reasons for the uprisings in 2011, whereas results 
from people’s responses in Wave IV will demonstrate whether democratic gains were 
achieved in the case-countries. 
Respondents place their answers along 4-point Likert-types scales16 which measure the extent 
of their agreement or disagreement with the question/statements made.17  
The Polyarchy Index is the criterion behind the selection of questions/statements which will 
describe people’s understanding of the democratic changes occurring in their countries since 
the Arab Spring. The questions/statements selected are;  
Table 3. Survey questions 
AB Questions: 
1. In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were 
held on [date]? 
2. “I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me 
how much trust you have in them: The elected council of representatives (the 
parliament).” 
3. To what extent do you think that “freedom to express opinions” is guaranteed 
in your country? “Freedom to join a political party” 
4. In your opinion, are people nowadays able to criticize the government 
without fear?* 
5. In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic?**18 
6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? “A 
democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems.” 
                                                          
15 http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/ab-waves 
16 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=disagree, and 4=strongly disagree 
17 one question has ten-points 
*The type of response changes from a Likert-type scale to a dichotomous “yes/no” response from Wave II 
onwards. Responses from WI on this question are hence merged. 
** This question uses a ten-point Likert-type scale. 
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Analytical framework 
Results from V-Dem and AB, concerning pathways of democracy in five Arab countries after 
the Arab Spring, are compared to one another to answer whether democratic gains have 
occurred. The table below relates survey questions, and V-Dem components to the theory of a 
Polyarchal Regime, as stated by Robert A. Dahl (1984). The linkages between AB and V-
Dem are explained further down. They are divided into the four categories in the polyarchal 
regime (as formulated by Coppedge and Reinicke (1990)). 
Table 4. Analytical framework: V-Dem components and Survey-data 
Dahl’s Polyarchal 
Regime: 
(Dahl, 1984:228-229) 
“Varieties of Democracy” 
components 
Questions: 
 “Relatively high 
responsiveness of the 
government to voters 
and election 
outcomes.”  
 “Accompanied by 
negligible or no 
coercion” 
 “Fairly conducted 
elections” 
Clean Elections Index 
1. Election other voting 
irregularities 
2. Election vote buying 
3. Election government 
intimidation 
4. Election other electoral 
violence 
5. Election voter registry 
6. EMB (Election 
Management Body) 
autonomy 
7. EMB capacity 
8. Election free and fair 
 
1. “In general, how would 
you evaluate the last 
parliamentary elections 
that were held on 
[date]?” 
 
 
 
 “Suffrage coextensive 
with the right to run for 
public office.”19 
 “A high degree of 
freedom to form 
relatively autonomous 
organizations of great 
variety, including, most 
crucially, opposition 
political parties.” 
Freedom of association index 
1. Civil Society Org. (CSO) 
entry and exit 
2. CSO repression 
3. Elections multiparty 
4. Opposition parties 
autonomy 
5. Party Ban  
6. Barriers to parties  
 
 
2. “Trust in Parliament” 
 
3. “Freedom to join a 
political party” 
                                                          
19 Not included among V-Dem indicators due to lack of relevance to the trajectories of Arab Spring. 
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 “Extensive protection 
of free expression, 
including criticism of 
the government, the 
regime, society, the 
dominant ideology, and 
so on.” 
 “The existence of 
alternative and often 
competing sources of 
information and 
persuasion not under 
the control of the 
government” 
 
Expanded Freedom of Expression 
Index 
1. Freedom of academic 
and cultural expression 
2. Freedom of discussion 
a. Freedom of 
discussion for 
men 
b. Freedom of 
discussion for 
women 
3. Harassment of 
journalists 
4. Government censorship 
effort – Internet  
5. Government censorship 
effort – Media 
6. Media bias 
7. Media self-censorship 
8. Print/broadcast media 
critical 
9. Print/broadcast media 
perspectives 
 
4. In your opinion, are 
people nowadays able to 
criticize the government 
without fear? 
The remaining two questions are used to 
summarize changes in people’s 
perception of democracy. 
Their inclusion is important for 
understanding people’s overarching 
understanding of the democratic 
performance in their country, while 
deciding whether democracy is the most 
favored political structure.  
5. “To what extent is your country 
democratic?”  
6. “A democratic system may have 
problems, yet it is better than other 
systems”  
The following definitions are borrowed from Varieties of Democracy (2017a) and Arab 
Barometer (2011). 
Clean Election Index: The government’s attitude toward election quality and political freedom 
is translated in this index. According to people, how impartial are those who count the votes 
(8)? Are those monitoring the elections (the EMB 6 & 7) independent of the regime? Are 
there repercussions (i.e. harassment) for those who do not wish to vote (3 & 4), or are they 
inclined to vote through bribery (1 & 2). 
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Question: The related question will inform us if voters experienced their last legislative 
election to be conducted fairly and without coercion.  
Freedom of Association Index: This index lists political groups which are governed by the 
people. People can change their political lives through “freedom to form relatively 
autonomous organizations” (Dahl, 1984:228) such as political parties (6) and civil societies 
(1). Such groups should not face harassments and repression by the government (2 & 5). 
Different political ideologies ought to be eligible to compete in elections (3) and free from 
government interventions (4). 
Question: “Trust in parliament” addresses whether the elected parties are trustworthy.20  
“Freedom to join a political party” describes people’s sentiment towards their ability to 
express their political ideologies, without facing harassments. 
Expanded Freedom of Expression Index: This index measures the extent to which individuals 
can speak on political topics in private and public spheres (2) or on cultural platforms (1) 
without facing harassment by i.e. the police or government. 
Are professional journalists censored by the government when questioning the status quo (4, 
5, & 6)? Do these journalists fear for their safety (3) and must thus censor themselves (7) to 
avoid harassment? The absence of these censorships allows the media to broadcast/print 
opinions which criticize the regime (8) and offer new ideas (9). 
Question: People’s perceived freedom to criticize their regime, government, society or “the 
dominant ideology” and their freedom to observe such discussions are scaled in this question. 
Questions on levels of democracy: The Arab Barometer has not specified the type of 
democracy that is referred to in question 5 and 6. Therefore, the most basic concept of 
democracy (free elections and freedom of expression) is assumed.  
                                                          
20 The discourse on the impact of trust on the perception of a country’s democratic performance in the Middle 
East is a continuously discussed topic (Spierings, 2017; Brixi et al. 2015), yet this thesis has touched on the 
elemental surface of the concept of trust, as it applies to the Polyarchal Regime’s contribution with 
autonomous political actors. 
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Popular opinion on these two questions will help determine whether people in five Arab 
countries have experienced more of democracy since the Arab Spring. 
4.1.3. Statistical description 
Data from both Arab Barometer (AB) and V-Dem are calculated through SPSS. Calculating 
survey data will differ slightly from the method used for V-Dem data. The aim is to compare 
their outcomes between 2006 and 2016.21  
V-Dem data will demonstrate the extent to which the five case-countries have obtained 
polyarchal regimes as a result of the Arab Spring, through linear graphs created in SPSS. The 
changes discovered will be compared to changes in people’s perception based on data from 
AB.  
People’s attitude toward democratic components in their country before the Arab Spring must 
improve by 2016, and the expert-data must show evidence of positive change in order for 
democratic gains to be assumed as an aftermath of the Arab Spring. The different ways in 
which expert-data and surveys answer whether the Arab Spring led to democratic gains will 
also provide insight to how different contemporary data sources operate. 
This section explains why the methods used in this thesis are appropriate for this research 
question, and describes how they work. 
Survey data 
Surveys from Arab Barometer will show popular opinion on democratic performance in five 
Arab countries. Answers from two different years will be compared in order to answer 
whether the Arab Spring led to democratic gains. A sophisticated method (MWU) of 
interpreting the results is chosen to make up for unequal samples of respondents (Corder & 
Foreman, 2009). 
Method  
A non-parametric Mann Whitney U-test (MWU) is chosen. This method is appropriate for 
unequally distributed independent samples as is the case when respondents are independent 
from each other.  
                                                          
21 Years vary due to available data 
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The MWU-test calculates the mean scores of ranked data. This test generates z-scores which 
help calculate the p-value (Field, 2009). Medians (Mdn) will be reported due to large sample 
sizes and the categorical data. The statistical significance comes from the MWU-test and is 
based on the difference between mean ranks, while medians which are the reported results, 
help show popular response.22  
After calculating the MWU-test, changes in answers between two surveys ought to be 
statistically significant in order to assume that people in Arab-majority countries have 
experienced significant change in their country’s democratic performance (whether for good 
or bad).   
The statistical significance level is set at a standard p<0.05 (2-tailed). The formulas used to 
calculate the reported values are mention in the appendix [under Formulas]. The asymptotic 
significance level is chosen to determine whether differences between responses are 
statistically significant. This version of significance level is reported due to the larger sample 
sizes. 
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
A more simple approach is used to illustrate expert-data findings. Again, SPSS will be used to 
decipher the change in democratic components in the Arab world since the Arab Spring, by 
mapping democratic changes between 2006 and 2016.23  
The V-Dem data is more visually comprehensive. Four multiple-line graphs are attached for 
each country – one demonstrates the overall Polyarchy Index (in the appendix), and the 
remaining three look closer at each sub-index.  
The statistics for the sub-indices range from 0 – 424. The statistics for the overall Polyarchy 
Index will range from 0 – 1 (Varieties of Democracy, 2017b). 
                                                          
22 Statistical significance may occur between groups, despite equal medians, since the mean ranks are more 
finely calculated. In these cases, statistical significance rejects the null hypothesis, though it may be confusing 
due to equal medians (UCLA IDRE, 2017). 
23 Years may vary based on available data. 
24 A higher score equals higher level of democracy 
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4.1.4. Limitations 
As mentioned in the section above on V-Dem, the available data has been too limited to offer 
a just representation of the democratic changes between 2006 and 2016. There are no 
solutions for such limitations, but doing the most with the data which is available. 
Another limitation is the absence of some case-countries from the Arab Barometer’s waves. 
The two most discussed countries in political science on the Arab Spring (Egypt and Tunisia) 
are missing from Wave I (2006-2007). Therefore, the Wave II (2011) surveys from these 
countries describe people’s perception of democracy during the Arab Spring.25 
Furthermore, AB’s formulations of questions and responses vary from Wave I with the other 
waves. This thesis will use the latest formulations of questions since they have applied since 
2011.  
The vagueness of the impact of level of trust may also alter its significance in this study. Yet, 
including it offers a more in-depth understanding for the popularity of political 
representatives. This knowledge will help determine whether Arab citizens in five case-
countries are confident in the democratic performance of their incumbents since the Arab 
Spring. 
The inability to generalize the democratic implications of the Arab Spring for all of the 
MENA-region is the greatest setback for this thesis. The limited available data makes a 
broader research unattainable at the moment, but the constant updates in databases gives hope 
for the ability to generalize democratic gains resulting from protests in the MENA-region in 
the future. 
5. Case-selection 
As mentioned in section 2, oil, military apparatus, and cultural/religious values play important 
roles in disconnecting the MENA-region from the rest of the world. Cultural and religious 
attributes are however not in line with the focus of this thesis, mostly due to its lack of impact 
on democratic transitions as mentioned in the previous literature (Gause 2011; Linz & Stepan 
2013).  
                                                          
25 WII has included Egyptians’ perception of their 2009 elections. 
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Moreover, oil and the military’s political influence are considered impactful for the MENA-
region after the series of protests during 2010-2013 [Table 2]. This thesis does not intend to 
test the mechanisms between these attributes and democratic gain, yet acknowledges their 
influence on the aftermaths of Arab Spring.  
An initial selection of case-countries included countries which experienced mass-protests with 
+10 000 participants. This list included four additional countries – Kuwait, Libya, Yemen, 
and Saudi Arabia. They were excluded due to lack of data.  
The remaining five countries (Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco), have data 
available for at least three survey-waves on AB [Table 5]. This study prefers data from Wave 
I as the starting point. Tunisia and Egypt’s absence from Wave I has required the inclusion of 
WII.  
Far more than these five countries were affected as a result of the uprisings (Brownlee et al. 
2015). The lack of quantifiable data and foreign interventions (Syria, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, 
and Iraq), and lack of upheavals and political reform (Oman and Qatar) have made gathering 
information about all countries involved in the Arab Spring a difficult task.  
This section proceeds by explaining the political backgrounds of the case-countries, as well as 
factors leading to their upheavals. 
Table 5. Countries included in each wave 
 
Country 
AB 
Wave 1 
 
(2006-7) 
AB 
Wave II 
 
(2010-11) 
AB 
Wave III 
 
(2013) 
AB 
Wave IV  
 
(2016) 
Tunisia  X X X 
Egypt   X X X 
Algeria  X X X X 
Jordan  X X X X 
Morocco  X  X X 
 
5.1 Tunisia  
Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba ruled the country for thirty years (1956-1987) 
following its independence from France in 1956 (Brownlee et al. 2015). Former army leader 
Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali succeeded Bourguiba in 1987 and remained in office until 2011 
when he was ousted by a military coup.  
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December 17, 2010 sparked the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” and marks the beginning of 
the Arab Spring. The cause of this revolution was to show solidarity with a street vendor 
named Mohammed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire in front of the police station in Ben 
Arous. His struggles with police brutality, lack of job and sufficient income, gathered 
thousands of people into the streets of Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and Tunis as a sign of unity 
and desperation for change.  
These protests led to military interventions, and the city of Kasserine lost 20 people. The 
result was nationwide protests for three weeks (Aljazeera, 2011). As a result of military 
intervention under the leadership of General Rachid Ammar, Ben Ali was exiled by the 
military the 14th of January 2011 (Kienle, 2012). Gen. Ammar reformed the Tunisian 
constitution. Among his reforms were more gender equality and less police brutality (Henry, 
Ji-Hyang, & Lee, 2012). He resigned in 2013. 
5.2. Egypt 
The British political colonization of Egypt was terminated in 1952. The Egyptian military’s 
role was critical in gaining political independence (Henry et al. 2012). The military’s efforts 
were, again, pivotal in their trajectories of the Arab Spring.  
Egypt’s president, former army leader Hosni Mubarak, served as the head of state since 1981. 
The murder of a civilian (Khaled Said) by a police officer on 6th of June, 2010 sparked a 
social media-movement called “We are all Khaled Said” (Kienle, 2012), which gained 
worldwide attention. The support from neighboring countries and the West exemplified how 
critical social media-engagement could be for a country’s domestic political affairs (Hussain 
& Howard, 2013). Street protests which followed resulted in Mubarak’s overthrow and the 
election of Mohamed Morsi (representative of Muslim Brotherhood) as his successor.  
His political agenda which concerned conservative, Islamic reforms were met with nation-
wide protests, led by army general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. With almost 11 million participants in 
the capital Cairo, this protest resulted in the overthrow of Morsi in 2012. Al-Sisi replaced the 
Muslim Brotherhood-leader. 
The revolutions in Egypt are often compared to those of Tunisia. In both, grass-roots 
organizations wanted a regime change, and both successfully toppled their leaders due to the 
military alliance. However, the advantages of their political reforms are dissimilar. 
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5.3. Algeria  
After a violent revolution against the French colonizers, Algeria gained independence in 
1962. The National Liberation Front (FNL) led the political and economic reforms which 
stabilized Algeria as an independent state. FNL faced challenges to their political reforms by 
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Conflicts between the two ideologies led to a bloody civil 
war, which lasted for seven years (1991-1998) (Mallat, 2016). The FNL has however 
maintained its grip on power. 
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika leads the country for his fourth consecutive term (1999-2019). 
Prior to the elections, people of the capital Alger took to the streets due to dissatisfactory 
neoliberal economic reforms which had led to the exacerbation of already existing income-
gaps (Brownlee et al. 2015).  
Protests have been numerous. However, the thought of reliving a civil war made Algerians 
more reluctant in pushing for their demands (Bellin, 2012). In addition, re-electing Bouteflika 
is predicted to counteract necessary economic reforms, while improvements in the political 
sphere look more promising. Bouteflika lifted a 19-year-old state of emergency (it helped to 
justify authorities’ harassment of Islamist oppositions to protect the establishment (Kao & 
Lust, 2017)), as well as removed language barriers in favor of minorities in 2012 (Entelis, 
2016).  
5.4. Jordan  
Jordan is a monarchy, which gained its independence from the British Empire in 1921. The 
Hashemite dynasty has ruled since, and the current King Abdullah II has been in power since 
1999. King Abdullah II has an overwhelming executive and legislative authority, among 
which has included the ability to appoint the Prime Minister (Tobin, 2012). 
High unemployment rates and police brutality drove people to the streets of the capital 
Amman in January 2011. The largest protest during this period consisted of 10 000 people, 
led by the largest opposition party; Islamic Action Front (IAF) (Tobin, 2012). Government 
loyalists committed violent counterattacks against the protesters, supposedly due to Prime 
Minister Marouf al-Bakhit’s orders. He was asked to resign by the people in October 2011. 
The King has since appointed two other Prime Ministers.  
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5.5. Morocco  
This monarchy gained independence from France in 1956, after which the Alaouite dynasty 
continued its reign. After his father and predecessor passed in 1999, King Mohammed VI 
attempted at modernizing Morocco’s constitution. King Mohammed VI’s initial work 
supported the marginalized and poor areas of Morocco. One attempt at bettering the country 
was through neoliberal economic reforms, which led to an increase in corruption and income-
gaps (Gause, 2011). February 2011 marks the beginning of the Moroccan Arab Spring.  
The king’s largest Islamist opposition party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), 
instigated much of the protests leading to the Moroccan Arab Spring and is currently the 
largest party in the multiparty parliament of Morocco (Hussain & Howard, 2013). Their aim 
has been to counteract attempts at modernization, by i.e. preventing gender-equal policies 
from ratification, or arranging a 12,000 body-protest as a sign of discontent (Maghraoui, 
2001). Prime Minister Saadeddine El-Othmani (PJD) is tasked by the King to reform the 
government. 
6. Results 
After gathering the results, they will be presented for each case-country in three steps. Step 1 
includes a direct comparison between expert-data (V-Dem) and the corresponding survey 
question (AB).  
Step 2 summarizes the findings from the comparisons. Step 3 will present the statistical 
analysis of the survey data, using the Mann Whitney U-test, through reporting the test 
outcome, median response, and the effect size that shows the proportion of changes between 
responses across survey waves. This structure clarifies differences between data sources, 
while interpreting whether the Arab Spring led to democratic gains. 
Years vary for each country, based on the available data. Hence, the outcomes do not offer a 
fair representation of changes occurring between 2006 and 2016. 
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6.1. Tunisia  
 
 
V-Dem (2009-2014) Arab Barometer (2011-2016) 
Clean Election Index:  
All indicators improved by 2014. Violence 
carried out by non-governmental entities 
was the only indicator with more democratic 
performance already in 2009 (Varieties of 
Democracy, 2017a:102). 
 
The democratic levels were maintained 
since 2011, when the pressure on the 
administration to better represent is people 
was at its peak. 
”Last election was free and fair”:26 
When asked in 2011, 1% of Tunisians 
believed that the 2009 elections (the last 
elections before the Jasmine Revolution) 
were “completely free and fair”. 
This number increased to 25.2% in 2016. 
The opinions concerned the 2014 elections. 
                                                          
26 Ben Ali’s regime banned international organizations from conducting surveys on political topics in Tunisia. 
Hence, no data regarding people’s perception of democracy is available prior to 2011. 
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V-Dem (2013-2016)                 Arab Barometer            (2011-
2016) 
Freedom of Association 
Index: 
All indicators improved by 
2014. 
“Trust in Parliament”: 
In 2013, only 8% felt great 
trust for their 
parliamentarians. This 
number was 6% in 2016. 
”Freedom to join political 
parties”: 
35.7% experienced 
“guaranteed freedom” to 
join a political party in 2011. 
37% agreed with this claim 
in 2016. 
 
This outcome mirrors the V-
Dem data. No barriers or 
bans were experienced since 
2011, so this attitude is 
expected. 
 
No parties were banned, nor 
had barriers to enter 
parliamentary elections. 
These levels were 
maintained since 2011.  
 
The legislative elections 
concerned during these 
surveys were conducted in 
2011 and 2014, respectively. 
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V-Dem (2009-2016) Arab Barometer (2011-2016) 
Expanded Freedom of Expression Index: 
All indicators improved by 2016. 
 
Media-related indicators did not perform as 
good as those related to freedom of 
discussion. They remained however 
moderately democratic (+2.00). 
“People are able to criticize their 
government without fear”:  
85% of respondents believed in having this 
freedom in 2011. Fewer people agreed in 
2016 (79.8%). 
 
 
What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Tunisia? 
To what extent is your country democratic? 
Only 1.1% of Tunisians viewed their 
country as “completely democratic” in 2011. 
This percentage increased to 10% in 2016.  
 
“A democratic system may have problems, 
yet it is better than any other system”: 23% 
of the respondents strongly agreed with this 
statement in 2011. This number increased to 
49% in 2016. 
 
 
*** 
Nelika Karimi 9208192923 AG2340 Final Paper 
38 
 
People’s view on the quality of their elections vary more than the expert-findings, yet the 
pattern remains the same (a sharp increase during the Arab Spring, met by a decline in 2016). 
Unity among Tunisians continued after the Arab Spring. Openly criticizing the government 
ceased to have violent repercussions and allowed for discussions around democratizing to 
take place, regardless of differing ideological backgrounds. This has, according to 
Hinnebusch (2015), been crucial for achieving high polyarchy-scores.  
Co-operation as such may be the reason behind the highly democratic multiparty elections of 
2015, and thus more freedom to join political parties.  
Democracy remains the most popular political system according to Tunisians, yet they believe 
they have a long way to go. Scholars, however, claim the first country which stood up against 
its leader in 2010 has achieved a “polyarchal regime” (Hinnebusch, 2015). 
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant 
differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring using the 
difference between mean ranks. The median (Mdn) and effect size (r) will be reported for 
each question. 
  
Differences in the mean ranks were statistically significant for all questions between 2011 
and 2016. 
 
U =    
 p =  
r = 
 
What do the different medians (Mdn) mean? 
Question 1-4,6 - (Mdn=1.00)=”Strongly Agree” 
(Mdn=2.00)=”Agree” 
(Mdn=3.00)=”Disagree” 
(Mdn=4.00)=”Strongly Disagree”  
Question 5 -(Mdn=+5.00)= Level of respondent’s country’s democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-
10=high levels) 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
133358,000 566917,000* 555219,000 610594,000 354713,000 434618,000 
,000 ,000 ,034 ,000 ,000 ,000 
,754 ,070 ,045 ,124 ,267 ,188 
Nelika Karimi 9208192923 AG2340 Final Paper 
39 
 
1. The attitude toward fairness and freeness of the latest legislative election in Tunisia 
saw a positive shift (Mdn=2.00) in 2016 compared to that in 2011 (Mdn=4.00). This 
difference was statistically significant (r=45%). 
2. Tunisians were not asked about their sense of trust for their parliamentarians in 2011. 
However, when asked in 2013 and 2016, the median response was a strong 
disagreement with the trustworthiness of their incumbents (Mdn=4.00). This outcome 
was statistically significant (r=5%).  
3. In 2011, Tunisians agreed with being free to join a political party in 2011, as much as 
they did in 2016(Mdn=2.00). The difference was statistically significant (r=5%). 
4. People of Tunisia were not afraid to criticize their government in 2011 (Mdn=1.00) or 
2016 (Mdn=1.00). This difference was statistically significant (r=13%). 
5. The perceived level of democracy in Tunisia remained on the same level (Mdn=5.00) 
across all waves. The findings were statistically significant (r=19%). 
6. Finally, Tunisians viewed democracy as the best system in both years (Mdn=2.00) for 
2011 but grew more fond of democracy in 2016 (Mdn=1.00). This change in attitude 
toward democracy as the best system was statistically significant (r=13%).   
*2013 versus 2016 
6.2. Egypt 
 
V-Dem (2005-2014) Arab Barometer (2011-2016) 
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Clean election Index:  
All indicators improved by 2014. 
 
Level of free- and fairness of elections, 
together with voter irregularities 
skyrocketed after the Arab uprisings. 
“The last national [legislative] election was 
free and fair”: 
8.4% viewed their 2010 elections as 
“completely free and fair”. This number 
increased to 46.3% in 2016. 
  
 
 
 
V-Dem (2005-2015) (2013-2016)            Arab Barometer              (2011-2016) 
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Freedom of Association 
Index: 
All indicators saw an 
improvement in the 
beginning of the Arab 
Spring. They were however 
short-lived. Results for 2015 
show a monopolization of 
CSO engagement by the 
government. 
 
Autonomy of parties are 
very low/non-existent 
according to the latest data 
from V-Dem (2015).  
“Trust in Parliament”: 
4% sensed a “great extent of 
trust” for their 
parliamentarians in 2013. 
This number increased to 
21% in 2016. 
 
The parliaments concern 
elections from 2010 and 
2014 respectively. 
“Freedom to join political 
parties”: 
This freedom was 
“guaranteed to a great 
extent” according to 61% 
respondents in 2011. This 
number decreased to 15% by 
2016. 
 
The findings mirror the V-
Dem data’s illustration of 
government intolerance for a 
free political engagement. 
 
 
V-dem (2005-2016) Arab Barometer (2011-2016) 
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Expanded Freedom of Expression: 
All indicators worsened by 2016. 
Background: 
All indicators experienced a peak in 2011, 
when the Arab Spring was at its most 
intense. 
“People are free to criticize their 
government without fear”: 
92% agreed with this statement when asked 
in 2011. 51% did so in 2016. 
 
 
What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Egypt? 
How democratic is Egypt?:  
Egyptians viewed their country as somewhat 
democratic, based on the larger portion 
selecting scale-point “5” on this question in 
2011 (24.5%)27. “5” was the most popular 
option in 2016 as well, and the largest 
portion (46%)28 scaled Egypt along the less-
democratic half of the scale.  
 
A democratic system may have problems, 
yet it is the best system:  
This question was not asked in 2016. There 
were no major changes in attitude between 
2011 and 2013. A larger portion of 
Egyptians strongly agreed with this 
statement in both waves (29.3% in 2011 and 
28% in 2013). 
 
 
*** 
Polyarchy-scores were low during the Arab Spring, but they have improved during the 
following years. However, the same public-will that led to the overthrow of Mubarak and 
Morsi, have obstructed a smooth transition of political ideology. Egyptian’s dissatisfaction 
with their leaders demonstrates a common dilemma of democracy – one powerful leader will 
not satisfy an ideologically diverse population. While a majority of Egyptian Islamists favored 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Muhammed Morsi, a large and secular population is in favor of 
his overthrow.  
The current regime under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been met with a challenging and highly 
demanding Egypt which has led to his desperate attempts at subduing the population through 
criminalizing street protests and restricting freedom of expression. In addition to the skeptic 
                                                          
27 45.7% selected points 6-10. 3.4% were identified as missing in this question. 
28 33.4% selected points 6-10. 20.5% were identified as missing in this question. 
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domestic popular opinion, we can conclude that Egypt has not obtained democratic gains as a 
result of the uprisings.  
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant 
differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring based on the 
difference in mean ranks. The median response (Mdn) and the effect size (r) will be reported 
for each question. 
Responses for Egypt 2011 and 2016 were very similar. Q5 has the only non-statistically 
significant outcome, and therefore maintains the null hypothesis. 
 
 
U =    
 p =  
 r= 
 
What do the different medians (Mdn) mean? 
Question 1-4,6 - (Mdn=1.00)=”Strongly Agree” 
(Mdn=2.00)=”Agree” 
(Mdn=3.00)=”Disagree” 
(Mdn=4.00)=”Strongly Disagree”  
Question 5 -(Mdn=+5.00)= Level of respondent’s country’s democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-
10=high levels) 
 
1. The attitude toward fairness and freeness of the latest legislative election in Egypt saw a 
positive shift in 2016 (Mdn=1.00) compared to that in 2011 (Mdn=3.00). This outcome 
was statistically significant (r=40%). 
2. Egyptians, alike Tunisians, were not asked in 2011 about their sense of trust for their 
parliamentarians therefore, results from the later stages of Arab Spring (WIII 2013) will 
be used for comparison. In 2016, people in Egypt were more trusting of their 
parliamentary incumbents (Mdn=2.00) than in 2013 (Mdn=4.00). This outcome is 
statistically significant (r=0%).  
3. Egyptians were not as optimistic about their freedom to join a political party in 2016 
(Mdn=3.00) as in 2011 (Mdn=1.00). The difference is statistically significant (r=32%). 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
174975,500 304604,500* 209116,500 406505,000 511824,000** 534325,500 
,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,064a ,000 
,678 ,000 ,565 ,472 ,075 ,040 
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4. People of Egypt strongly agreed with having the ability to criticize their government 
without fear in 2011 (Mdn=1.00) as well as in 2016 (Mdn=1.00). There were statistically 
significant changes (r=30%). 
5. Egyptians perceived their country equally democratic in 2011, as they did in 2013 
(Mdn=5.00). The difference was not statistically significant (r=5%). 
6. This question was not asked in 2016. Egyptians agreed that democracy is the best form 
of government in 2013 (Mdn=2.00) and 2011 (Mdn=2.00). There is a statistically 
significant difference in responses despite equal medians (r=4%).  
 
Xa: Difference was not statistically significant. 
*2013 versus 2016 
**2011 versus 2013 
6.3. Algeria 
 
*”Election voter registry” is identical to ”Election government intimidation”. 
 
V-Dem (2007-2012) Arab Barometer (2006-2016) 
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Clean election Index: 
Indicators related to lack of corruption and 
fairness of elections improved by 2012. 
 
There were no parliamentary elections since 
the Arab Spring. 
“The last [legislative] election in my country 
was held free and fair”: 
14% viewed the 2002 elections as 
completely free and fair, when asked in 
2006. 
This number decreased to 10% in 2016, 
concerning the 2012 elections. 
 
The lack of legislative elections since the 
Arab Spring is a limitation in understating 
the quality of Algerian elections. 
 
V-Dem (2007-2016) Arab Barometer (2006-2016) 
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Freedom of Association 
Index: 
All indicators worsened by 
2016. 
 
Indicators related to 
association improved during 
the Arab Spring, presumably 
resulting from the protests. 
“Trust in parliament”: 
7% had a great of trust for 
their parliamentarians when 
asked in 2006. This 
percentage decreased to 4% 
among respondents of 2016.  
 
The responses from 2016 
regard elections during, and 
not after, the Arab Spring 
(2012). 
“Freedom to join political 
party”:  
18% “strongly agreed” 
with this statement in 
2006, which increased to 
29% by 2016.  
 
 
V-Dem (2007-2016) Arab Barometer (2006-2016) 
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Expanded Freedom of Expression Index: 
Most indicators remained stagnant from 
2007 and 2016. 
 
Slight improvements were made in 
freedom of expression through different 
channels. They were short-lived. 
“People are able to criticize their 
government without fear”: 
58% agreed with this statement in 2006.29 
55% agreed in 2016. 
 
 
 
What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Algeria? 
How democratic is Algeria?  
A larger portion of respondents chose low 
level of democracy for Algeria in 2006 
(44% “1-5”) – this half of the scale received 
58% in 2016. This indicates a perceived 
decline of the Algerian democracy. 
A democratic system may have problems, 
yet it is the best system:  
27.4% “strongly agreed” with this statement 
in 2016, which is a 0.5% increase from the 
2006 data (26.9%). 
*** 
Unfortunately, the Clean Election Index does not provide enough data to rightfully make 
assumptions about the democratic gains in Algeria in the area of election quality. This also 
negatively impacts the interpretations from “Freedom of Association” data. There are no 
solutions for lack of available data. 
What stands out in the AB results from Algeria is that the change in Algerians’ perception of 
their parliament does not mirror the changes made in the polyarchy-scores between 2006 and 
2016. The “Freedom of Association”-graph shows a deterioration of all indicators by 2016, 
compared to their 2006-scores. Yet Algerians’ trust for, and perceived freedom to join 
political parties improved by 2016. These results do not explain why fewer people viewed 
their last legislative elections as free- and fair in 2016. 
These differing outcomes may indicate a sense of hopelessness among the Algerian people, 
based on what the available data provides. Aggravations of democratic components since 
                                                          
29 Merging 1 & 2 
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2011, combined with people’s current reluctance to demand political reforms, increase the 
possibility that the Algerian Spring is at a halt and may re-occur in a more aggressive manner 
in the future.  
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant 
differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring using the 
difference between mean ranks. The median (Mdn) and effect size (r) will be reported for 
each question. 
The alternative hypothesis is claimed for questions 1, 2, 4, and 6 for Algeria in 2006 versus 
2016. Differences between questions were statistically significant. 
 
    
U = 
 p =  
r= 
 
What do the different medians (Mdn) mean? 
Question 1-4,6 - (Mdn=1.00)=”Strongly Agree” 
(Mdn=2.00)=”Agree” 
(Mdn=3.00)=”Disagree” 
(Mdn=4.00)=”Strongly Disagree”  
Question 5 -(Mdn=+5.00)= Level of respondent’s country’s democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-
10=high levels) 
1. The attitude toward fairness and freeness of the latest legislative election in Algeria did 
not change between 2006 and 2016 (Mdn=3.00). This outcome was statistically 
significant (r=8%). 
2. People strongly disagreed with the ability to trust their parliamentarians in 2016 
(Mdn=4.00), which was an exacerbation of their attitude in 2007 (Mdn=3.00). This 
difference was however not statistically significant (r=6%).  
3. People’s ability to join political parties was perceived to be equally present in 2006, as in 
2016 (Mdn=2.00). The median response for 2013 was however more promising 
(Mdn=1.00). The difference in people’s perceived freedom to join political parties was 
not statistically significant (r=10%). 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
395190,000 578172,500 566563,500 280419,500 475850,500 574146,500 
,000 ,000 ,383a ,000 ,877a ,000 
  ,135 ,135 ,018 ,511 ,003 ,075 
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4. People of Algeria were less afraid to criticize their government in 2016 (Mdn=1.00) as 
they were in 2006 (Mdn=2.00). This difference was statistically significant (r=33%). 
5. Algerians perceived their country as equally democratic in 2016 as they did back in 2007 
(Mdn=5.00). This difference was not statistically significant (r=0%). 
6. Conclusively, Algerians’ preference of democracy as the best form of government 
remained the same in 2016 (Mdn=2.00) against 2007 (Mdn=2.00), where the median 
respondent agreed, rather than disagreed with the statement. The difference was 
statistically significant (r=6%). 
Xa: Difference was not statistically significant. 
6.4. Jordan 
 
V-Dem  (2007-2016) Arab Barometer (2006-2016) 
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Clean election index: 
All indicators (beside EMB Capacity) 
improved by 2016. 
 
For Jordan, a major step toward 
democratizing was to replace the infamous 
SNTV electoral system with proportional 
representation (PR) before the September 
2016 election. This reform is accounted for 
in this graph and shows promising 
developments. 
“Last election was free and fair”: 
The four available waves for Jordan only 
give insight to two elections – one in 2003 
and another in 2013.  
2003 elections were viewed by 29% as 
“completely free and fair” when asked in 
2006, which decreased to 19% regarding the 
2013 elections (from 2016 surveys). The 
latest election of 2015 is not included. 
 
The 2016 wave does not account for the 
latest election, after the removal of SNTV. 
This can explain the decline seen in the 
results. Future research may show a drastic 
improvement in peoples attitude regarding 
fairness of their 2015 elections. 
 
V-Dem (2007-2016) Arab Barometer (2006-2016) 
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Freedom of association 
index: 
All indicators show sign of 
pre-existing moderate levels 
of democracy (+2.00). Not 
much has changed in this 
monarchy since the Arab 
Spring. 
 
One can argue that 
announcing the PR system 
presumably had a large 
impact on the freedom of 
association, since it 
encourages more parties to 
compete despite ideology 
(“elections multiparty”)30 , 
although the 2016 data does 
not show signs of dramatic 
change. 
“Trust in Parliament”:  
19.8% had “great deal of 
trust” for the parliament in 
2006. 5.5% did so in 2016.  
 
Again, more updated 
information about elections 
after implementing the PR 
system is required. 
“Freedom to join political 
parties”: 
8% “strongly agreed with 
this statement in 2006. This 
number only rose by 2% in 
the upcoming 10 years.  
(10.3% in 2016).  
 
Changes in tolerance toward 
differing political parties 
have not been dramatic, 
according to the graph.  
 
                                                          
30 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/16/jordans-holding-elections-next-week-
heres-what-to-expect/?utm_term=.728e78ee1902  
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V-Dem (2007-2016) Arab Barometer (2006-2016) 
Expanded freedom of expression: 
Indicators related to freedom of discussion 
had inherently better democratic levels than 
the remaining indicators. They also 
continued to rise after the Arab Spring. 
 
Journalistic work has been met with less 
freedom since the Arab Spring, which 
performed previously at low levels of 
democracy (Varieties of Democracy, 
2017a:251). 
“People are able to criticize their 
government without fear”: 
10.8% answered yes to this question in 
2006.31 This number increased to 59.2% in 
2016.  
 
 
 
What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Jordan? 
To what extent is your country democratic?: 
The second half of the scale, which is the 
positive half, consists of 60% of the 
“A democratic system may have problems, 
yet it is the best system”:  
                                                          
31 Merging 1 & 2 
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respondents in 2006 – with 11.7% viewing 
Jordan as “completely democratic”. Those 
who believe that Jordan is a “complete 
democracy” covered only 11.8% in 2016, 
but the positive half of the scale was less 
popular in Wave IV (55%).  
 
26.3% “strongly agreed” with this statement 
in 2006. This view of democracy increased 
to 34% in 2016. 
*** 
Unfortunately, the latest AB data does not cover the 2016 elections using the PR system. 
Hence, judging from the polyarchy-scores in “Clean Election”-graph, election quality-related 
indicators sustained their level of democracy from 2013. The change in the voting system may 
have been the reason. This, again, alters the understating of the “Freedom of Association” 
graph and surveys – much like the limitations experienced with the case of Algeria. 
Based on the V-Dem measurements, Jordan achieved democratic gains in some respect. The 
“Expanded Freedom of Expression”-graph, together with survey data, show improvements in 
freedom of discussion. Media-outlet related indicators, on the other hand, have declined since 
the Arab Spring. The polyarchy-scores for media-related indicators were the lowest among all 
polyarchy variables.  
However, the overall domestic perception of democracy highlights that the Jordanian 
democracy requires more work. More people were fond of this political system in later years, 
yet restrictions on civil liberties may terminate a democratic transition.  
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant 
differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring the difference 
between mean ranks. The median (Mdn) and effect size (r) will be reported for each 
question. 
Only the question on freedom to join a political party saw non-significant changes. 
 
 
U =    
 p =  
r= 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
384573,000 729050,000 529761,000 151588,500 550116,500 684849,500 
,000 ,000 ,926a ,000 ,001 ,023 
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What do the different medians (Mdn) mean? 
Question 1-4,6 - (Mdn=1.00)=”Strongly Agree” 
(Mdn=2.00)=”Agree” 
(Mdn=3.00)=”Disagree” 
(Mdn=4.00)=”Strongly Disagree”  
Question 5 -(Mdn=+5.00)= Level of respondent’s country’s democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-
10=high levels) 
 
1. Jordanians agreed that the latest legislative election was free and fair with minor issues 
in 2006 (Mdn=2.00) as well as in 2016 (Mdn=2.00). This outcome was statistically 
significant (r=10%). 
2. People strongly disagreed with the trustworthiness of their parliamentarians in 2016 
(Mdn=4.00). This was a remarkable decline from their trust for their incumbents in 
2006 (Mdn=2.00). This outcome was statistically significant (r=25%).  
3. Jordanians disagreed with having the freedom to join a political party in 2006 
(Mdn=3.00) as well as in 2016 (Mdn=3.00). There was no statistically significant 
difference (r=0%). 
4. People of Jordan were not as afraid to criticize their government in 2016 (Mdn=1.00) 
as they were in 2006 (Mdn=3.00). This outcome was statistically significant (r=45%). 
5. Jordanians’ perception of their country’s level of democracy in 2006 (Mdn=7.00) 
showed no sign of improvement in 2016 (Mdn=7.00). This outcome was statistically 
significant (r=6%). 
6. Conclusively, Jordanians’ attitude toward democracy as the best form of government 
remained the same in 2016 (Mdn=2.00) as it was in 2006 (Mdn=2.00). The outcome 
was still statistically significant (r=4%). 
,146 ,361 ,002 ,696 ,068 ,045 
Xa: Difference was not statistically significant. 
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6.5. Morocco 
 
V-Dem (2007-2016) Arab Barometer (2013-2016) 
Clean Election Index: 
There is a mixed development among these 
indicators until 2016. Almost all worsened 
by 2016. 
 
The democratic performance of these 
indicators is at large very low. 
“Last [legislative] election was free and 
fair”: 
13% viewed elections in 2011 as completely 
free and fair. This percentage decreased to 
12% in 2016, concerning the same election. 
 
Both WIII and WIV concern election in 
2011. Elections in 2006 are invalidated due 
to fraud allegations, leading to another 
election in the consecutive year. AB WI was 
conducted before the 2007 general elections.  
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V-Dem (2007-2016) Arab Barometer (2006-2016) 
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Freedom of Association 
Index: 
All indicators had moderate 
levels of democratic 
performance according to V-
Dem (+2.00). They also 
mostly improved after 2011. 
 
With the largest opposition 
group (PJD) as leading party 
in parliament for a second 
term, the Moroccan regime 
shows tolerance for 
contesting ideologies in its 
politics. The increase in 
“opposition parties’ 
autonomy” can also be 
explained as a result of this 
tolerance (Zerhouni, 2016).  
“Trust in Parliament”: 
10% greatly trusted their 
parliamentarians in 2006. 
This number decreased to 
2% by 2016. 
 
The concerned elections 
took place in 2006 and 2011, 
respectively. 
“Freedom to join a political 
organization”: 
27.6% strongly agreed with 
having such freedom in 
2006. The number was 
47.4% for 2016. 
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V-dem (2007-2016) Arab Barometer (2006-2016) 
Expanded Freedom of Expression Index: 
Most indicators have largely stagnated since 
2007.  
 
Media-related indicators are performing 
more poorly than the rest by stagnating on 
low levels of democracy.  
“People are able to criticize their 
government without fear”: 
 35.7% Moroccans believed they were free 
to criticize their government without fear in 
2006. This number rose to 70% by 2016. 
  
 
What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Morocco? 
How democratic is Morocco?  
The largest portion of respondents selected 
“5” in 2006 (19%). Score “5” was also the 
most popular response in 2016, again, with 
19% of respondents choosing it. The first 
half of the scale accumulates a larger portion 
of the popular opinion in 2016 (57.7%), 
similar to 2006 (53.3%). 
 
“A democratic system may have problems, 
yet it is better than other systems”:  
Those “strongly agreeing” with this 
statement decreased by 25% by 2016 
(52.2% in 2006 versus 27.4% in 2016).  
 
 
*** 
Lack of information on all elections since the Arab Spring affects how democratic changes 
are mapped. Information on the perception of quality of elections is therefore limited in the 
case of Morocco.  
The case of Morocco has had some similarities to Jordan. Both are pseudo-rentier monarchies, 
which as a result of the Arab Spring have encouraged a more nuanced legislative body to take 
shape,32 as well as allowing more freedom of discussion on political topics.  
                                                          
32 Jordanian elections are include many parties, and Morocco’ parliament is authorized to appoint the MP. 
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Morocco is however unique to other case-countries, as it is the only country where people 
trust their parliament more than they did prior to the Arab Spring, while enjoying more 
freedom to join a political party.  
Another outcome, which is unique to Morocco, is the citizens’ overall view of democracy. On 
the one hand, Morocco’s perceived level of democracy has not improved. On the other, 
Moroccans grew less fond of democracy by 2016. This is an interesting development of 
perception of democracy among Moroccans, which deserves more research. 
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant 
differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring the difference 
between mean ranks. The median (Mdn) and effect size (r) will be reported for each 
question. 
 
The alternative hypothesis is claimed for question 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 from Morocco. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
272903,000 599884,500 463435,500 143626,000 553253,000 474338,500 U =    
,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,103a ,000 
 p =  
r=  ,265 ,083 ,235 ,713 ,035 ,216 
 
What do the different medians (Mdn) mean? 
Question 1-4,6 - (Mdn=1.00)=”Strongly Agree” 
(Mdn=2.00)=”Agree” 
(Mdn=3.00)=”Disagree” 
(Mdn=4.00)=”Strongly Disagree”  
Question 5 -(Mdn=+5.00)= Level of respondent’s country’s democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-
10=high levels) 
1. The attitude toward fairness and freeness of the latest legislative election in Morocco 
saw a positive shift in 2016, with most people agreeing with the claim (Mdn=2.00), 
compared to that in 2006 where people disagreed with the statement (Mdn=3.00). 
This difference was statistically significant (r=20%). 
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Xa: Difference was not statistically significant. 
How do the changes in response vary among the case-countries? 
The following table ranks case-countries based on their difference in perception of democracy 
between the years. This table aims to simplify the understanding of scope of change in 
democratic components for each case-country according to popular opinion. The tables which 
pertain to each wave are included in the appendix. 
Question Countries ranked based on largest change in perception of democracy 
(% of WIV – WI (or WII)) 
1 2 3 4 5 
“The last 
[legislative] 
national election 
was free and fair” 
Tunisia 
+57.5% 
(WII) 
Egypt 
+53.9% 
(WII) 
Morocco 
+16.8% 
Algeria  
-19.5% 
 
Jordan  
-18.8% 
“Trust in 
parliament” 
Morocco 
-2.1% 
Algeria  
-12.5% 
Jordan 
-38.1% 
Egypt  
*** 
Tunisia  
*** 
“People are free to 
join political 
Morocco Jordan Tunisia Algeria Egypt  
2. People were less trusting of their parliamentary incumbents in 2006 (Mdn=4.00) than 
in 2016 (Mdn=3.00). Regardless, Moroccans viewed their parliamentarians as 
untrustworthy. This difference was statistically significant (r=6%). 
3. Moroccans strongly agreed with having the freedom to join political parties in 2016 
(Mdn=1.00). This freedom was less experienced in 2006 (Mdn=2.00). The findings 
were statistically significant (r=16%). 
4. Moroccans were not afraid to criticize their government in 2016 (Mdn=1.00) 
as they were in 2006 (Mdn=3.00). This difference was statistically significant 
(r=44%). 
5. People of Morocco perceived their country equally democratic in 2006 (Mdn=5.00) as 
they did in 2016 (Mdn=5.00). This outcome was not statistically significant (r=3%). 
6. Conclusively, Moroccans were less convinced that democracy was the best form of 
government in 2016 (Mdn=2.00) compared to their perception of the political system 
in 2006 (Mdn=1.00) (r=11%). 
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parties without 
fear” 
+5.4% +3.2% -2.3% 
(WII) 
-49.9% -58.9% 
(WII) 
“People are free to 
criticize their 
government 
without fear” 
Morocco 
+31.6% 
 
Jordan 
+24.6% 
 
Algeria  
+15.1% 
Tunisia  
-10.5% 
(WII) 
Egypt  
-41.1% 
(WII) 
On a 10-point 
scale, please state 
to what extent do 
is [respondent’s 
country] 
democratic? 
Tunisia  
+10.6% 
(WII) 
Egypt  
+6% 
(WII) 
Jordan  
+1.5% 
 
Morocco 
-0.5% 
Algeria  
-7.7% 
“A democratic 
system may have 
problems, yet it is 
better than other 
systems” 
Jordan 
+2% 
Tunisia  
-3.7% 
(WII) 
Algeria  
-7.2% 
 
Morocco  
-13% 
Egypt 
*** 
 
This table illustrates the difference between changes when comparing popular opinion from 
WI (WII) with WIV. Judging from the outcomes, Morocco has experienced positive changes 
in three of six questions. In other words, Moroccans’ attitude toward democratic components 
in their country has improved the most among the five case-countries. Tunisia is in second 
place, with most improvements in perceived level of democracy and free elections.  
Conclusion 
This study assesses whether the series of protests known as the Arab Spring has led to 
democratic gains. A wave of protests across eleven Arab countries33 between 2010 and 2013 
signify the critical juncture known as the Arab Spring. Millions of protesters took to the 
streets of Arab-majority countries, demanding better living standards and democratic 
governance.  
By asking whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains, I as well as researchers 
examining the Arab Spring, refer to the impact of protests in 2010 to 2013 on democratic 
                                                          
33 [Table 2] 
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progress. Such a question requires a fine-grained quantitative study on whether the series of 
protests known as the Arab Spring have in fact led to democratic gains. 
Hence, this thesis looks at data from surveys and compares them to expert-data on democratic 
performance regarding five Arab countries. The observed components are inspired by Robert 
Dahl’s theory of a Polyarchal regime which is a fundamental conceptualization of democracy, 
where both fair, competitive elections and civil liberties are required.  
This ambitious choice of data has posed a number of limitations for this thesis. In many cases, 
quality of election could not be mapped due to lack of data from surveys because they were 
conducted before the elections. This limitation affected the understanding of Jordan the most, 
I believe, because the anticipated change in electoral system from the biased SNTV to the 
more popular PR system has not been accounted for in the Arab Barometer. 
Also, the absence of Egypt and Tunisia from WI (2006) limits the information on the status 
quo in the two countries prior to the Arab Spring. The earliest surveys from 2011 do concern 
2009 elections for Egypt, yet questions on freedom of expression and trust reflect the 
circumstances during, not before, the Arab Spring.  
It needs mentioning that, this thesis has not included all countries involved in the Arab 
uprisings, which alters the generalizability of the Arab Spring’s impact on democratic gains in 
the MENA-region.34 When met with obstacles such as lack of available data, there are no 
solutions to make up for missing information. Regardless of these setbacks, I have attempted 
at answering whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains, without the expectation to 
generalize the outcomes.  
As a coincidence, all countries which have been absent, except Yemen, have been rentier-
states. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain for instance, three oil-rich monarchies, experienced 
nationwide protests in 2011 but were all diminished due to generous subsidies provided by the 
state (Yom, 2016).35  
Speaking of rentier-states, Algeria is the only rentier-state among the five case-countries, and 
the remaining four are pseudo-rentier states. Oil-rents in Algeria have enabled the provision 
of generous subsidies to silence protesters, much like rentier monarchies. This tactic 
                                                          
34 Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Kuwait, and Syria are all absent from the latest versions of both data sources 
35 Their oil-riches cannot be claimed to be the reason for their absence from data, but can contribute to why they 
have not been discussed or received attention as much as the other, five case-countries in this thesis.  
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succeeded easily, since Algerians refrained from using an aggressive approach in fear of 
another civil war, unlike the attitudes seen in Egypt and Tunisia. Close political ties between 
the government and the military were also discouraging.  
Two pseudo rentier-states, Egypt and Tunisia, have gained much attention because of their 
experiences with politically autonomous militaries. The military forces’ participation in the 
Arab Spring was crucial for the overthrow of both presidents. However, their absence from 
WI on AB leads to a limited comparison of the two countries’ aftermaths from the Arab 
Spring. 
Egypt and Tunisia remain the most studied cases in relation to the Arab Spring. A critical 
difference between the two is the gravity of ideological fractionalizations, which has altered 
the levels of organization among opposition groups. As reported in the introducing part on 
Tunisia, Ben Ali was effectively succeeded by Ammar Rachid, while Mubarak’s overthrow 
led to what many Egyptians viewed as “backsliding” of political ideologies, hence, a rapid 
removal of Morsi. Egypt’s current President el-Sisi, likewise, has failed to satisfy people’s 
demands. This can be linked to the impact of culture and modernization on the likelihood of 
democratization. 
The case of pseudo-rentier monarchies (Jordan and Morocco) is more complex. While a more 
diverse parliament hints at more political freedom, King Abdullah II and King Hassan VI 
maintain much of the political power. Moreover, the empirical data in this study illustrates a 
beginning of restrictions against media-platforms and freedom of cultural expression. 
So has the Arab Spring led to democratic gains? 
The question is complex to answer, as the definition of democratic gains is multifaceted. The 
operationalization of democratic gains in this study, the polyarchal regime, requires high-
quality elections, as well as institutions which protect freedom of expression and association. 
Empirical data from the five case-countries36 shows that while some variables of polyarchy 
were changed for the better after the Arab Spring, other variables momentarily improved or 
even worsened.  
For instance, free-and fairness of elections improved, both in V-Dem and according to people. 
However, trust for elected parliamentarians worsened after the Arab Spring. At first glance, 
                                                          
36 The data from V-Dem and AB has not covered the same elections for Egypt and Jordan. 
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these two outcomes oppose each other, since the first implies a fair representation of people’s 
political preference, whereas the latter claims that people do not have faith in their 
representatives.  
While the impact of trust on people’s view of democracy has been mentioned at face-value in 
this study, the contradicting development between perceived fairness of elections and trust for 
parliamentarians deserves more attention. What statements or behaviors from incumbents 
have made Arab citizens in Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan to doubt their parliamentarians?  
The methods and materials used to answer whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic 
gains are ambitious and limited. The answer to whether the Arab Spring led to democratic 
gains can therefore not be generalized for the MENA-region. Yet, expert-data for the five 
case-countries in this thesis only show improvements in all democratic components for 
Tunisia. Tunisia’s well-known success-story from the Arab Spring is not as clear when 
looking at the popular opinion from the Arab Barometer surveys, which I believe deserves 
more research when determining democratic gains in Tunisia.  
The absence of international interference, oil, and ideological fractionalization has contributed 
to the positive outcomes, which will hopefully be sustainable.  
While democratic components such as electoral democracy and freedom of 
association/expression have improved to different extents since 2011, people are dissatisfied 
with their country’s democratic performance – more now than before the Arab Spring. This 
raises the question of whether one of the most favored definitions of democracy (polyarchal 
regime) is equally acceptable as democracy in the MENA-region, or if that region views 
democracy in another way. We are familiar with the demand for democracy as one of the 
main instigators of the Arab Spring – but are we familiar with the definition of democratic 
gains according to those who took to the streets? This speculation deserves further research.  
 
Regarding the usage of different data-sources for describing democratic change, how do 
survey data and expert-data describe the aftermaths of the Arab Spring?  
Surveys from Arab Barometer (AB) have mirrored the V-Dem findings in their pattern of 
change. Only when surveys were conducted before elections, did the results differ with those 
from V-Dem. Nonetheless, AB has offered additional material for determining whether the 
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Arab Spring led toward democratic gains in observing people’s preference of democracy 
(question 6), as well as their perception of its performance in their country (question 5).  
Graphs on the complete Polyarchy Index (Appendix) illustrate improvements of electoral 
democracy, freedom of association, and expression by 2013 for all five countries. However, 
continued improvements occurred only in the monarchies, and survey-tables in the appendices 
also show depreciations in the perceived level of democracy since the Arab Spring (2013). 
It would be an understatement to claim that the democratic gains and declines seen in the data 
only result from the protests of the Arab Spring. International interventions, the military, 
cultural and ideological differences, etc., have all played significant roles in the observed 
pathways. Furthermore, topics which have not been included in this study such as the impact 
of political will, international relations and economic contributors on democratic changes in 
the MENA-region deserve more research. 
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Appendix Tunisia  
V-Dem - Polyarchy Index 
 
 
Arab Barometer 
Variable 2011 – 
September 
(WII) 
2013 – 
February 
(WIII) 
Difference 
between the 
years 2011-
2013 
2016 – May 
(WIV) 
Difference 
between the 
years 2011-
2016 
In general, how 
would you 
evaluate the last 
parliamentary 
elections that 
were held on  
Oct. 25th 2009 
(WII) 
Completely 
free and fair: 
0.9% 
Free and fair 
but with minor 
problems: 
0.5% 
Completely 
free and fair: 
56.7% 
Free and fair 
but with minor 
problems: 
18.6% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
Completely free 
and fair/ with 
minor problems: 
+73.9% 
Free and fair, with 
major 
problems/Not free 
and fair: -74.1% 
Completely 
free and fair: 
25.2% 
Free and fair 
but with minor 
problems: 
34% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
Completely free 
and fair/with 
minor problems: 
+57.8% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/Not 
free and fair: -
54.9% 
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Oct. 23th 2011 
(WIII) 
Oct. 26th 2014? 
(WIV) 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 1% 
Not free and 
fair: 86.8% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
10.8% 
problems: 
8.3% 
Not free and 
fair: 5.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
10.9% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -0.1% 
problems: 
14.7% 
Not free and 
fair: 18.2% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 8% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -2.8% 
“I’m going to 
name a number of 
institutions. For 
each one, please 
tell me how much 
trust you have in 
them: 
The elected 
council of 
representatives 
(the parliament).” 
 
Not Asked A great deal of 
trust:7.9% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:23.4% 
Not very much 
trust:14.6% 
No trust at 
all:47.8% 
Don’t 
know/decline 
to 
answer:6.3% 
No data A great deal of 
trust:6% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:14.2% 
Not very much 
trust:21.2% 
No trust at 
all:49.7% 
Don’t 
know/decline 
to answer:9% 
A great 
deal/Quite a lot of 
trust:-11.1% 
Not very 
much/No trust at 
all:+8.5% 
Don’t 
know/decline to 
answer:+2.7% 
(compares 2013 
to 2016) 
To what extent do 
you think that 
“freedom to 
express opinions” 
is guaranteed in 
your country? 
“Freedom to join 
a political party” 
Guaranteed to 
a great 
extent:35.7% 
Guaranteed to 
a medium 
extent:32.4% 
Guaranteed to 
a limited 
extent:10.8% 
Guaranteed to 
great 
extent:53.7% 
Guaranteed to 
medium 
extent:26.3% 
Guaranteed to 
limited 
extent:5.6% 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:-24.1% 
Guaranteed to 
limited extent/not 
guaranteed: -3.3% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:-8.2% 
Guaranteed to 
great extent: 
37% 
Guaranteed to 
medium 
extent: 27.4% 
Guaranteed to 
limited extent: 
8.5% 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:-3.7% 
Guaranteed to 
limited extent/not 
guaranteed: -
13.7% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:+7.6% 
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Not 
guaranteed:7.6
% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to 
answer:13.4% 
Not 
guaranteed:9.3
% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to 
answer:5.2% 
Not 
guaranteed: 
19% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to answer: 
8.1% 
In your opinion, 
are people 
nowadays able to 
criticize the 
government 
without fear? 
(Strongly) 
agree: 85.1% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: 9.2% 
I don’t know: 
5.3% 
Missing: 0.4% 
Yes: 85.4% 
No: 12.8% 
I don’t know: 
1.7% 
Missing: 0.1% 
(Strongly) agree 
/Yes:+0.3% 
(Strongly) 
disagree/No:3.6% 
I don’t know: -
3.6% 
Missing: -0.3% 
Yes: 79.8% 
No: 17.7% 
I don’t know: 
2.6% 
Missing: 17% 
(Strongly) agree 
/Yes: -5.3% 
(Strongly) 
disagree/No: 
+8.5% 
I don’t know: -
2.7% 
Missing: +16.6% 
In your opinion, 
to what extent is 
your country 
democratic?”  
 
(1(complete 
dictatorship) -10 
(complete 
democracy) + 
there is no 
democracy, not 
important, cant 
choose/decline to 
answer (not read). 
Low level (1-5) 
High level (6-10) 
 
Complete 
dictatorship: 
4.3% 
1: 3.4% 
2: 7.1% 
3: 12.1% 
4: 14.2% 
5: 22.1% 
6: 11% 
7: 5.8% 
8: 3.5% 
9: 1.1% 
Complete 
democracy: 
3.3% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
No democracy 
whatsoever: 
13.5% 
2: 8.7% 
3: 9.5% 
4: 12.4% 
5: 21% 
6: 9.5% 
7: 7.1% 
8: 5.9% 
9: 1.2% 
Democratic to 
the greatest 
extent 
possible: 2.2% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: -
0.5% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy: -1.3% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to answer: 
-3.5% 
Complete 
dictatorship37: 
3% 
2: 4.8% 
3: 7.7% 
4: 7% 
5: 24.6% 
6: 7.3% 
7: 9.5% 
8: 7.1% 
9: 2.1% 
Complete 
democracy: 
10%  
Not 
important/Can
’t 
choose/decline 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: -
12.7% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy: 
+12.3% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: -3.5% 
                                                          
37 This wave has merged “1” with “complete dictatorship”.  
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decline to 
answer: 12.1% 
decline to 
answer: 8.5% 
to 
answer:8.6% 
 
To what extent do 
you agree or 
disagree with the 
following 
statements? 
 
“A democratic 
system may have 
problems, yet it is 
better than other 
systems.” 
Strongly 
agree: 23.1% 
Agree:46.9% 
Disagree:6.6% 
Strongly 
disagree:1.2% 
Don’t know: 
21.9% 
Decline to 
answer:0.3% 
Strongly 
agree: 33.8% 
Agree:36.3% 
Disagree:8.6% 
Strongly 
disagree:6.6% 
Don’t 
know:14% 
Decline to 
answer:0.7% 
Strongly agree: 
Agree:+10.7% 
Disagree:-10.6% 
Strongly disagree: 
+2% 
Don’t know: 
+5.4% 
Decline to 
answer:+0.4% 
Strongly 
agree: 48.9% 
Agree: 36.8% 
Disagree: 
5.4% 
Strongly 
disagree: 4.1% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to answer: 
4.8% 
Strongly agree: 
+25.8% 
Agree:-10.1% 
Disagree:-1.2% 
Strongly 
disagree: +2.9% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:+4.5% 
 
Appendix Egypt 
V-Dem - Polyarchy Index 
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Arab Barometer 
Variable 2011-
June/July 
(WII) 
2013 – 
March/April 
(WIII) 
Difference 
between the 
years 
(2011-2013) 
2016 – May 
(WIV) 
Difference 
between the 
years 
(2011-2016) 
In general, how 
would you 
evaluate the last 
parliamentary 
elections that 
were held on  
Nov. 28th 2010 
(WII & III) 
Oct. 17th 2015 
(WIV) 
Completely 
free and fair: 
8.4% 
Free and fair 
but with minor 
problems: 
2.9% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 
2.6% 
Not free and 
fair: 82.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
Completely free 
and fair: 21.7% 
Free and fair 
but with minor 
problems: 
15.5% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 
12.5% 
Not free and 
fair: 30.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
19.6% 
Completely 
free and 
fair/with 
minor 
problems: 
+25.9% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/Not 
free and fair: -
41.9% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
+15.9% 
Completely free 
and fair: 46.3% 
Free and fair but 
with minor 
problems: 
19.5% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 8.6% 
Not free and 
fair: 12.8% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
12.9% 
Completely free 
and fair/ with 
minor problems: 
+55.2% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/Not 
free and fair: -
62.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: +8.8% 
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to answer: 
3.7% 
“I’m going to 
name a number of 
institutions. For 
each one, please 
tell me how much 
trust you have in 
them: 
The elected 
council of 
representatives 
(the parliament).” 
 
Not asked A great deal of 
trust:4.2% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:13.3% 
Not very much 
trust:16.1% 
No trust at 
all:59.3% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to answer:7.1% 
 
No Data A great deal of 
trust:20.8% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:26.8% 
Not very much 
trust:26.9% 
No trust at 
all:17.4% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:8.1% 
 
A great 
deal/Quite a lot of 
trust:+20.1% 
Not very 
much/No trust at 
all:-37.1% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:+1% 
(compares 2013 
to 2016) 
To what extent do 
you think that 
“freedom to 
express opinions” 
is guaranteed in 
your country? 
“Freedom to join 
a political party” 
Guaranteed to 
a great extent: 
61.1%  
Guaranteed to 
a medium 
extent: 29% 
Guaranteed to 
a limited 
extent:2.7% 
Not 
guaranteed: 
1.6% 
Don’t 
know/decline 
to answer: 
5.6% 
Guaranteed to a 
great extent: 
42.1% 
Guaranteed to a 
medium extent: 
22.9% 
Guaranteed to a 
limited 
extent:15.1% 
Not guaranteed: 
10.5% 
Don’t 
know/decline to 
answer: 9.4% 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:-25.1% 
Guaranteed to 
limited 
extent/not 
guaranteed: 
+25.3% 
Don’t 
know/decline 
to 
answer:+3.8% 
Guaranteed to 
great 
extent:15.2% 
Guaranteed to a 
medium 
extent:21.3% 
Guaranteed to a 
limited 
extent:11.3% 
Not 
guaranteed:31.3
% 
Don’t 
know/decline to 
answer:21% 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:-53.6% 
Guaranteed to 
limited extent/not 
guaranteed: 
+37.3% 
Don’t 
know/decline to 
answer:+15.4% 
In your opinion, 
are people 
nowadays able to 
criticize the 
Yes: 92.5% 
No: 5.4% 
Yes: 83.1% 
No: 14.4% 
Yes: -9.4% 
No: +´9% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
Yes: 51.3% 
No: 45.8% 
Yes: -41.2% 
No: +40.4% 
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government 
without fear? 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 2% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 2.4% 
to answer: 
+0.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 2.8% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: +0.8% 
In your opinion, 
to what extent is 
your country 
democratic?”  
 
(1(complete 
dictatorship) -10 
(complete 
democracy) + 
there is no 
democracy, not 
important, cant 
choose/decline to 
answer (not read). 
Low level (1-5) 
High level (6-10) 
 
 
No democracy 
whatsoever: 
3% 
1: 2.4% 
2: 3.7% 
3: 6.3% 
4: 10.9% 
5: 24.6% 
6: 13.4%  
7: 12.9% 
8: 10.4% 
9: 3.5% 
Democratic to 
the greatest 
extent 
possible: 5.5%  
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
3.4% 
There’s no 
democracy: 
14.4% 
1: 9.8% 
2: 15.4% 
3: 13.4% 
4: 5.6% 
5: 12.8% 
6: 4.7% 
7: 4.8% 
8: 1.5% 
9: 0.8% 
Complete 
democracy: 
1.6% 
Not 
important/Can’t 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
13.2% 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: 
+20.4% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy:-
32.3%  
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 
+11.8% 
No democracy 
whatsoever: 3% 
1: 2.3% 
2: 3.8% 
3: 11% 
4: 8.9% 
5: 20.2% 
6: 10.6%  
7: 11.2% 
8: 6.2% 
9: 2.2% 
Democratic to 
the greatest 
extent possible: 
3.2%  
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 2.1% 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: 
+1.1% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy: -
12.3% 
Not 
important/Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: 2.1% 
To what extent do 
you agree or 
disagree with the 
following 
statements? 
 
“A democratic 
system may have 
problems, yet it is 
better than other 
systems.” 
Strongly 
agree: 29.2% 
Agree:42.5% 
Disagree:14.6
% 
Strongly 
disagree: 5% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
Strongly agree: 
28.5% 
Agree: 37.9% 
Disagree:6.8% 
Strongly 
disagree:6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
20.8% 
(Strongly) 
agree: -35.3% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: -
6.8% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
+7.1% 
Not Asked No data 
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to answer: 
13.7% 
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Appendix Algeria 
V-Dem – Polyarchy Index 
 
Arab Barometer 
Variable 2007- 
October 
(WI) 
2013 – 
March/April 
(WIII) 
Difference 
between the 
years 2007-
2013 
2016 – May 
(WIV) 
Difference 
between the 
years 2007-
2016 
In general, how 
would you 
evaluate the last 
parliamentary 
elections that 
were held on  
May 30th, 2002 
(WI) 
May 10th 2012 
(WIII & WIV) 
Completely 
free and fair: 
14.4% 
Free and fair 
but with 
minor 
problems: 
23.3% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
Completely 
free and fair: 
11.1% 
Free and fair 
but with minor 
problems: 
36.8% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
Completely 
free and fair/ 
with minor 
problems: 
+10.2% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/Not 
free and fair: -
6.2% 
Completely free 
and fair: 10.7% 
Free and fair but 
with minor 
problems: 19.8% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 12.6% 
Completely free 
and fair/ with 
minor problems: -
6.2% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/Not free 
and fair: +10.7% 
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problems: 
13.4% 
Not free and 
fair: 24.4% 
Cant 
choose/declin
e to answer: 
24.5% 
problems: 
12.2% 
Not free and 
fair: 19.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to 
answer:20.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer:-
3.9% 
Not free and fair: 
35.9% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: 21.1% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -3.4% 
“I’m going to 
name a number of 
institutions. For 
each one, please 
tell me how much 
trust you have in 
them: 
The elected 
council of 
representatives 
(the parliament).” 
 
A great deal 
of trust:7.3% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:18.8% 
Not very 
much 
trust:22.2% 
No trust at 
all:41.5% 
Don’t 
know/Declin
e to 
answer:10.2
% 
 
A great extent: 
7.8% 
A medium 
extent: 32.3% 
A limited 
extent:27.5% 
Absolutely do 
not trust 
it:27.5% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to answer:4.9% 
 
A 
great/medium 
extent of trust: 
+14% 
Limited 
extent/no trust 
at all:-9.7% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to answer:-
5.3% 
 
A great deal of 
trust:4.7% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:11.8% 
Not very much 
trust:24.6% 
No trust at 
all:55.3% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:3.6% 
 
A great deal/quite 
a lot of trust:-
9.6% 
Not very much/ 
no trust at 
all:+18.2% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:-6.6% 
 
To what extent do 
you think that 
“freedom to 
express opinions” 
is guaranteed in 
your country? 
“Freedom to join 
a political party” 
Strongly 
agree: 18.1% 
Agree:34.8% 
Disagree:17
% 
Strongly 
disagree: 
9.8% 
Cant 
choose/declin
e to answer: 
20.3% 
Guaranteed to 
great:50.4% 
Guaranteed to 
medium 
extent:29.7% 
Guaranteed to 
limited extent: 
7.9% 
Not 
guaranteed: 
1.2% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:+28.2% 
Guaranteed to 
limited 
extent/not 
guaranteed: -
7.7% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
9.6% 
Guaranteed to 
great extent: 
29.2% 
Guaranteed to 
medium extent: 
28.9% 
Guaranteed to 
limited 
extent:20.7% 
Not 
guaranteed:14.3% 
Don’t 
know/decline to 
answer:6.9% 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:+3.2% 
Guaranteed to 
limited extent/not 
guaranteed: +8.3 
Don’t 
know/decline to 
answer:-13.4% 
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to answer: 
10.7% 
In your opinion, 
are people 
nowadays able to 
criticize the 
government 
without fear? 
(Strongly) 
agree: 45% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: 
37.9% 
Cant 
choose/declin
e to answer: 
17% 
Yes: 62.8% 
No: 26.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
10.6% 
(Strongly) 
agree/Yes: 
+17.8% 
(Strongly) 
disagree/No: -
11.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
6.4% 
Yes: 60.4% 
No: 36.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: 3.3% 
(Strongly) 
agree/Yes: 
+15.4% 
(Strongly) 
disagree/No: -
1.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -13.7% 
In your opinion, 
to what extent is 
your country 
democratic?”  
 
(1(complete 
dictatorship) -10 
(complete 
democracy) + 
there is no 
democracy, not 
important, cant 
choose/decline to 
answer (not read). 
Low level (1-5) 
High level (6-10) 
 
Complete 
dictatorship: 
29% 
2: 6.5% 
3: 8.8% 
4: 9.5% 
5: 10.5% 
6: 7.2% 
7: 7.4% 
8: 5.4% 
9: 2.8% 
Complete 
democracy: 
3.6% 
Not 
important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 
20.3% 
Complete 
dictatorship: 
1.3% 
2: 2.1% 
3: 4.5% 
4: 7.8% 
5: 15.7% 
6: 13.5% 
7: 19% 
8: 18.7% 
9: 7% 
Complete 
democracy: 
3.1% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 7.4% 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: -
22.8% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy: 
+34.9% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer:-12.9% 
Complete 
dictatorship: 6% 
2: 8% 
3: 11.6% 
4: 14.4% 
5: 18% 
6: 10.6% 
7: 9.8% 
8: 5.1% 
9: 3% 
Complete 
democracy: 1.6%  
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 26.7% 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: 
+14.9% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy: 
+6.1% 
Not important/ 
Can’t choose/ 
decline to answer: 
+6.4% 
 
To what extent do 
you agree or 
disagree with the 
following 
statements? 
Strongly 
agree: 26.9% 
Agree: 42.1% 
Strongly agree: 
18.4% 
Agree: 51.8% 
(Strongly) 
agree: +3.2% 
Strongly agree: 
24.7% 
Agree: 51% 
(Strongly) agree: 
+6.7% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: +6.2% 
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“A democratic 
system may have 
problems, yet it is 
better than other 
systems.” 
Disagree: 9% 
Strongly 
disagree: 
5.2% 
Cant 
choose/declin
e to answer: 
16.8% 
 
Disagree: 
11.7% 
Strongly 
disagree: 2.2% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
15.8% 
 
(Strongly) 
disagree: -
0.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -1% 
 
Disagree: 15.1% 
Strongly 
disagree: 5.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: 3.9% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -12.9% 
 
 
Appendix Jordan 
V-Dem - Polyarchy Index 
 
Arab Barometer 
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Variable 2007 – 
March (WI) 
2013 – Dec.-
January 
(WIII) 
Difference 
between 
2006 & 
2013 
2016 – May 
(WIV) 
Difference 
between 2007 
& 2016 
In general, how 
would you 
evaluate the last 
parliamentary 
elections that 
were held on  
June 17th , 2003 
(WI) 
Nov. 9th, 2010 
(WIII) 
Jan. 23rd, 2013 
(WIV) 
Completely 
free and fair: 
28.9 % 
Free and fair 
but with minor 
problems: 
25% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 
10.4% 
Not free and 
fair: 23.8% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
24.2% 
Completely free 
and fair: 8.3% 
Free and fair but 
with minor 
problems: 20% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 
13.9% 
Not free and 
fair: 41.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
16.2% 
Completely 
free and fair/ 
with minor 
problems: -
25.6% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/Not 
free and fair: 
+21.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
8% 
Completely 
free and fair: 
24.6% 
Free and fair 
but with minor 
problems: 
27.7% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 
12.6% 
Not free and 
fair: 23.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
11.6% 
Completely free 
and fair /with 
minor problems: 
-1.6% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/ Not 
free and fair:+2% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -13.6% 
“I’m going to 
name a number of 
institutions. For 
each one, please 
tell me how much 
trust you have in 
them: 
The elected 
council of 
representatives 
(the parliament).” 
(trust in 
parliament) 
A great deal of 
trust:19.8% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:35.2% 
Not very much 
trust:16.1% 
No trust at 
all:22.4% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to 
answer:6.6% 
 
A great deal of 
trust:11.5% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:28.4% 
Not very much 
trust:18.2% 
No trust at 
all:39.9% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:2.1% 
 
A great deal/ 
Quite a lot of 
trust:-15.1% 
Not very 
much/ no trust 
at all:+19.6% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to answer:-
4.5% 
 
A great deal of 
trust:5.5% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:15.2% 
Not very much 
trust:13.6% 
No trust at 
all:44.7% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to answer:21% 
 
A great deal/ 
Quite a lot of 
trust:-34.3% 
Not very much/ 
no trust at 
all:+19.8% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:+14.4% 
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To what extent do 
you think that 
“freedom to 
express opinions” 
is guaranteed in 
your country? 
“Freedom to join 
a political party” 
Strongly 
agree: 8% 
Agree:27.3% 
Don’t 
agree:33.8% 
Don’t agree at 
all: 17.1% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
13.7% 
Guaranteed to a 
great extent: 
21.3% 
Guaranteed to a 
medium extent: 
32.3% 
Guaranteed to a 
limited 
extent:19.1% 
Not guaranteed 
at all: 17.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
10.1% 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:+18.3% 
Guaranteed to 
limited 
extent/not 
guaranteed: -
27.3%  
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
3.6% 
Guaranteed to 
great 
extent:12.9% 
Guaranteed to 
medium 
extent:31.2% 
Guaranteed to 
limited 
extent:16.3% 
Not 
guaranteed:29.
4% 
Don’t 
know/decline 
to 
answer:10.3% 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:+8.1% 
Guaranteed to 
limited extent/not 
guaranteed: -
5.2% 
Don’t 
know/decline to 
answer:-3.4% 
In your opinion, 
are people 
nowadays able to 
criticize the 
government 
without fear? 
(Strongly) 
agree: 44.5% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: 
44.5% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
9.9% 
Yes: 71.6% 
No: 23.9% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 4.6% 
(Strongly) 
agree: +27.1% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: -
21.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
5.3% 
Yes: 74% 
No: 25.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer:0.6% 
Yes: +30.5% 
No: +19.1%  
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer:-9.3% 
In your opinion, 
to what extent is 
your country 
democratic?”  
 
(1(complete 
dictatorship) -10 
(complete 
democracy) + 
there is no 
Complete 
dictatorship: 
3.6% 
2: 2.7% 
3: 2.5% 
4: 4.9% 
5: 19.7% 
6: 12% 
7: 14.3% 
Complete 
dictatorship: 
4.4% 
2: 3.6% 
3: 4.9% 
4: 6% 
5: 24.8% 
6: 13.7% 
7: 13.8% 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: 
+7.8% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy: -
8.2% 
Not important: 
+0.3% 
Complete 
dictatorship: 
3.7% 
2: 1.9% 
3: 2.5% 
4: 4.6% 
5: 18.8% 
6: 10.1% 
7: 16.5% 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: -
1.9% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy:  
+8.2% 
Not important: 
+1.3% 
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democracy, not 
important, can’t 
choose/decline to 
answer (do not 
read). 
Low level (1-5) 
High level (6-10) 
 
 
8: 13.2% 
9: 7.9% 
Complete 
democracy: 
11.7% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 7.2% 
8: 12.7% 
9: 5% 
Complete 
democracy: 
5.7% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 5.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
1.9% 
8: 17.4% 
9: 7.3% 
Complete 
democracy: 
14.8% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 2.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -6.1% 
 
To what extent do 
you agree or 
disagree with the 
following 
statements? 
 
“A democratic 
system may have 
problems, yet it is 
better than other 
systems.” 
Strongly 
agree: 26.3% 
Agree:47.9% 
Disagree:10.1
% 
Strongly 
disagree: 2.2% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
13.3% 
Strongly agree: 
26.2% 
Agree:48.2% 
Disagree:14.7% 
Strongly 
disagree: 2.8% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
11.5% 
(Strongly) 
agree: -3.8% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: 
+5.6% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
1.8% 
Strongly agree: 
33.8% 
Agree:51.1% 
Disagree: 9.1% 
Strongly 
disagree: 3% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 3% 
(Strongly) 
agree:+10.7% 
(Strongly) 
Disagree:-0.2% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -10.3% 
 
Appendix Morocco 
V-Dem - Polyarchy Index 
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Arab Barometer 
Variable 2007 – 
September 
(WI) 
2013 – 
April/June 
(WIII) 
Difference 
between 2007 
& 2013 
2016 – May 
(WIV) 
Difference 
between 2007 
& 2016 
In general, how 
would you 
evaluate the last 
parliamentary 
elections that 
were held on  
Date missing, 
2006 (WI) 
Nov. 25th 2011 
(WIII & WIV) 
Completely 
free and fair: 
13.8% 
Free and fair 
with minor 
problems: 
13.3% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 
11.5% 
Completely free 
and fair:17.7% 
Free and fair 
with minor 
problems: 
28.9% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 
16.3% 
Not free and 
fair: 23.7% 
Completely free 
and fair/ with 
minor problems: 
+19.5% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/Not 
free and fair: -
7.8% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
11.7% 
Completely 
free and fair: 
12%  
Free and fair 
with minor 
problems: 
31% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems: 
11% 
Completely free 
and fair/ with 
minor problems: 
+15.9% 
Free and fair, 
with major 
problems/Not 
free and fair: --
24.8% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: +6.9% 
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Not free and 
fair: 36.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
25.1% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
13.4% 
Not free and 
fair: 12% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
32% 
“I’m going to 
name a number of 
institutions. For 
each one, please 
tell me how much 
trust you have in 
them: 
The elected 
council of 
representatives 
(the parliament).” 
 
(Trust in 
parliament) 
A great deal 
of trust:10.6% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:14.3% 
Not very 
much 
trust:20.8% 
No trust at 
all:47.5% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to answer:7% 
 
A great deal of 
trust:7.8% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:20.4% 
Not very much 
trust:21.9% 
No trust at 
all:43.9% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:6% 
 
A great 
extent/deal of 
trust:-2.6% 
Quite a lot of 
trust/medium 
extent:+6.1% 
Not very much 
trust/limited 
extent:+1.1% 
No trust at 
all/absolutely do 
not trust it:-
3.6% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:-1% 
 
A great deal of 
trust:2.3% 
Quite a lot of 
trust:22.3% 
Not very much 
trust:35.2% 
No trust at 
all:32.8% 
Don’t 
know/Decline 
to 
answer:7.5% 
 
A great 
extent/deal of 
trust + Quite a lot 
of trust/medium 
extent:-0.3% 
Not very much 
trust/limited 
extent + No trust 
at all/absolutely 
do not trust it: -
0.3% 
Don’t 
know/Decline to 
answer:+0.5% 
 
To what extent do 
you think that 
“freedom to 
express opinions” 
is guaranteed in 
your country? 
“Freedom to join 
a political party” 
Strongly 
agree: 27.6% 
Agree:36.8% 
Disagree:18.2
% 
Strongly 
disagree: 7.3% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
10.1% 
Guaranteed to a 
great extent: 
40.7% 
Guaranteed to a 
medium extent: 
25.3% 
Guaranteed to a 
limited extent: 
15.3% 
No guarantee: 
12.9% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 5.9% 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:+1.6% 
Guaranteed to 
limited 
extent/not 
guaranteed: 
+2.7%  
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
5.2% 
Guaranteed to 
a great extent: 
47.1% 
Guaranteed to 
a medium 
extent:30.1% 
Guaranteed to 
a limited 
extent:8.2% 
No guarantee: 
4% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
Guaranteed to 
great/medium 
extent:+13.4% 
Guaranteed to 
limited extent/not 
guaranteed: 
+13.2% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: +0.2% 
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to answer: 
10.3% 
In your opinion, 
are people 
nowadays able to 
criticize the 
government 
without fear? 
(Strongly) 
agree: 34.7% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: 
57.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
6.9% 
Yes: 60.9% 
No: 30.5% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 8.5% 
Yes: +26.2% 
No: -26.9% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
+1.6% 
Yes: 70% 
No: 20% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
10% 
Yes: +35.3 
No: -37.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: +3.1% 
In your opinion, 
to what extent is 
your country 
democratic?”  
 
(1(complete 
dictatorship) -10 
(complete 
democracy) + 
there is no 
democracy, not 
important, cant 
choose/decline to 
answer (not read). 
Low level (1-5) 
High level (6-10) 
 
 
Complete 
dictatorship: 
16.3% 
2: 7.8% 
3: 6.7% 
4: 8.2% 
5: 19% 
6: 7.7% 
7: 5.6% 
8: 7.1% 
9: 3.7% 
Complete 
democracy: 
9.8% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 7% 
Complete 
dictatorship:  
12.5% 
2: 15.3% 
3: 16.3% 
4: 11.5% 
5: 15.7% 
6: 7.4% 
7: 4.9% 
8: 4.5% 
9: 2.2% 
Complete 
democracy: 
2.6% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 7.1% 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: 
+15.4% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy: -
12.3% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer:+0.1% 
Complete 
dictatorship:  
3.5% 
2: 5% 
3: 10.8% 
4: 10.3% 
5: 18.7% 
6: 16.5% 
7: 12.7% 
8: 7% 
9: 1.4% 
Complete 
democracy: 
0.8% 
Not important/ 
Cant choose/ 
decline to 
answer: 18.3% 
Low level 
of/Complete 
dictatorship: -
10.7% 
High level 
of/Complete 
democracy: 
+4.5% 
Not 
important/Cant 
choose/ decline to 
answer: +11.3% 
To what extent do 
you agree or 
disagree with the 
following 
statements? 
 
Strongly 
agree: 52.2% 
Agree: 32.4% 
Disagree: 
4.5% 
Strongly agree: 
23.3% 
Agree: 45.7% 
Disagree: 13.8% 
(Strongly) 
agree: -15.9% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: 
+15.6% 
Strongly 
agree: 27% 
Agree: 51.8% 
Disagree: 
5.7% 
(Strongly) agree: 
-5.8% 
(Strongly) 
disagree: -1% 
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“A democratic 
system may have 
problems, yet it is 
better than other 
systems.” 
Strongly 
disagree: 3.1% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 8% 
 
Strongly 
disagree: 9.4% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 7.8% 
 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: -
0.2% 
 
Strongly 
disagree: 0.9% 
Cant 
choose/decline 
to answer: 
5.4% 
 
Cant 
choose/decline to 
answer: -2.6% 
 
 
Formulas  
U=n1n2+(N1(N1+1))/ 2 −R1 
(Field, 2009:544) 
Mann Whitney U-test – used in calculating 
the p-value to determine whether the 
difference in groups is statistically 
significant (Rx = sum of ranks for group x). 
p = (U=u) Asymptotic p-value – determines whether 
null hypothesis should be chosen over 
alternative hypothesis (i.e. when there is no 
difference between the groups). If p<0.05, 
the null hypothesis will be rejected for an 
alternative hypothesis (Field, 2009). 
r = Z/√N Effect size – divides the z-score given by 
the MWU-test with the square root of the 
total number of cases. The effect size 
calculates the statistical power of the 
outcome in proportion to the total variance. 
“r =.10 (small effect): In this case, the effect 
explains 1% of the total variance. 
r =.30 (medium effect): The effect accounts 
for 9% of the total variance. 
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r =.50 (large effect): The effect accounts for 
25% of the variance.” (Field, 2009:57) 
 
 
Summary of change between survey-waves 
WI (2006-7) / WII (2011) 
Question Countries ranked based on most (strongly) agreeing with the 
statements (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 
“The last 
[legislative] 
national 
election was 
free and fair” 
Jordan 
(71.1%) 
Algeria 
(50%) 
Morocco 
(36.2%) 
Egypt 
(11.9%) 
Tunisia 
(1.7%) 
“Trust in 
parliament” 
Jordan 
(58.8%) 
Algeria 
(29%) 
Morocco 
(26.7%) 
Egypt (%) 
MISSING 
Tunisia (%) 
MISSING 
People are 
free to join 
political 
parties 
without fear 
Egypt 
(95.4%) 
Morocco 
(71.6%) 
Tunisia 
(66.7%) 
Algeria 
(66.4%) 
Jordan 
(40.9%) 
People are 
free to 
criticize their 
government 
without fear 
Egypt 
(92.4%) 
Tunisia 
(90.3%) 
Jordan 
(49.4%) 
Algeria 
(45.3%) 
Morocco 
(38.4%) 
“A 
democratic 
system may 
have 
problems, yet 
it is better 
than other 
systems” 
Morocco 
(91.8%) 
Tunisia 
(89.4%) 
Jordan 
(85.8%) 
Algeria 
(82.9%) 
Egypt 
(78.6%) 
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On a 10-
point scale, 
please state 
to what 
extent do is 
[respondent’s 
country]dem
ocratic? 
Jordan 
(64.6%) 
Egypt 
(47.9%) 
Morocco 
(38.9%) 
Algeria 
(37.8%) 
Tunisia 
(25.4%) 
Wave IV (2016) 
Question Countries ranked based on most (strongly) agreeing with the 
statements (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 
“The last 
[legislative] 
national 
election was 
free and fair” 
Egypt 
(65.8%) 
Tunisia 
(59.2%) 
Jordan 
(52.3%) 
Morocco 
(43%) 
Algeria 
(30.5%) 
“Trust in 
parliament” 
Egypt 
(47.6%) 
Morocco 
(24.6%) 
Jordan 
(20.7%) 
Tunisia 
(20.2%) 
Algeria 
(16.5%) 
People are 
free to join 
political 
parties 
without fear 
Morocco 
(77%) 
Tunisia 
(64.4%) 
Jordan 
(44.1%) 
Egypt 
(36.5%) 
Algeria 
(16.5%) 
People are 
free to 
criticize their 
government 
without fear 
Tunisia 
(79.8%) 
Jordan 
(74%) 
Morocco 
(70%) 
Algeria 
(60.4%) 
Egypt 
(51.3%) 
On a 10-
point scale, 
please state 
to what 
extent do is 
[respondent’s 
country]dem
Jordan 
(66.1%) 
Egypt 
(53.6%) 
Morocco 
(38.4%) 
Tunisia 
(36%) 
Algeria 
(30.1%) 
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ocratic? (6-
10) 
“A 
democratic 
system may 
have 
problems, yet 
it is better 
than other 
systems” 
Tunisia 
(85.7%) 
Jordan 
(84.9%) 
Morocco 
(78.8%) 
Algeria 
(75.7%) 
Egypt (%) 
*** 
 
